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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, I focus on a Korean entertainment show Non-Summit as a media
text through which to investigate racialized and gendered representations of transnational
identities in Korean media. Specifically, I examine discursive strategies through which
foreign male characters are racialized and gendered in order to interrogate the hegemonic
masculinity of White, Western, and heterosexual identities. On the basis of a critical
textual analysis of Non-Summit, I discuss Non-Summit reproduces and distributes
representations of White, Western, and heterosexual masculinity as dominant foreign
identities. Furthermore, I examine the ideological implications of such discourse on the
hegemonic foreign identities given the current condition of multiculturalism in Korean
society and context of transnational Whiteness. I found characterization of foreign
panelists functions as a process of privileging White, Western, and heterosexual
masculinity in Non-Summit. It reveals racialization in Non-Summit is insidiously and
complicatedly formed through discourse of liberalism, egalitarianism, and
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homonationalism as a process of “othering.” Similarly, by connecting egalitarian, liberal,
and tolerative identities to White, Western, and heterosexual panelists, who are from
European countries, Canada, and the U.S., the hegemonic masculinity is dominantly
possessed by Western masculine identities. In addition, the dominant representations of
foreign characters reproduce postracial and postgender ideologies that emphasize we live
in the raceless and genderless world. However, the ideological message should be
critically evaluated and challenged in that Non-Summit is a media space with maintaining
the dominant visibility of White, Western, educated, middle-class, and heterosexual
masculinity.
Key words: Whiteness, Non-Summit, Transnational identity, Multiculturalism,
Globalization, Critical Media Studies, Critical Cultural Studies
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Introduction
Korea is one of the few countries known as an ethnically and racially
homogeneous country. However, the common belief of Korean blood purity has come
under question. Since the late 1980s, multiculturalism has become a significant concept
in Korea given the increase of international mobility in the era of globalization.
Globalization has accelerated the movement of capital, cultural resources, information,
and immigrant labour, driven by international economic policies and global institutions.
This increased mobility and introduction of multiculturalism has challenged racial and
ethnic homogeneity in Korea. Immigrants and mixed-race descendants, who disrupt the
homogeneous look of Koreans but share the same language, cultural and social
experience, question what it means to be fully Korean in the newly multicultural society.
Indeed, accepting foreign others not only as friends and neighbors, but also as partners
and family has started to question the illusion of a single raced nation-state and
ethnocentric kinship in Korea.
In order to examine these changes specifically, I contextualize the socioeconomic
impetus and how multiculturalism has been implemented in Korea. The main
socioeconomic force for multiculturalism is the condition of rapid economic growth. Due
to a lack of natural resources and ongoing political conflict with, and threat from, North
Korea, major economic development of the southern part of the Korean Peninsula has
depended on export-oriented and cooperative economic growth with the United States
(Cho, 2008; Han, 2015). Inevitably, rapid economic growth has led to a lack of labor
force in manufacturing areas and 3D (difficult, dirty, and dangerous) occupations in
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Korea (Choi, 2006). In this social context, the Korean government has opened the door to
accept global capital and labour since 1990s, which subsequently meant the number of
foreigners has increased noticeably (Park & Lee, 2015). This was a significant change
considering Korea was one of the major countries that exported cheap labour to other
countries after the Korean War. Under this nationwide change, the number of resident
foreigners has increased to 200,1828 in 2016, which accounted for 3.9 % of the whole
population (Yu, 2016). Additionally, Kim (2016) reported the number of foreign
employees has increased to about 962,000 in 2016, which grew by 25,000 (2.6%)
compared to the previous year; and about half of these workers are in the manufacturing
industry. This rapid change in the influx of immigrants reveals how transnational labour
has been mobilized in and through the interlocked relations with global capital flow.
Not only has economic growth led to decrease in manufacturing labor done by
Koreans, but also it has led to different social issues such as the decrease in marriage and
birth rates in rural areas. This decrease is due to the massive movement from rural to
urban areas where there are more job opportunities. In order to deal with this domestic
issue, the Korean government has encouraged international marriage since the early
2000s, especially in the farming and fishing communities (Lee, 2016). Along with male
immigrant workers who provide an alternative physical labour force, many foreign brides
mostly from developing Asian countries are “imported” to provide a different type of
“labor” in rural areas of Korea. Among resident foreigners in Korea, there are 143,206
migrant spouses as of 2016 and 118,281 are foreign brides among migrant spouses
(Korean Statistical Information Service, 2016). In brief, the socioeconomic shift has
shaped two major aspects of multicultural identity in Korea: migrant labour in
2

manufacturing areas and foreign brides married to Korean men in rural areas. These two
leading factors demonstrate how multiculturalism in Korea is a state-led solution to
domestic problems such as a lack of cheap labour, decreasing marriage rate in rural areas,
and low-birth-rate.
Furthermore, the increased global popularity of Korean popular media,
particularly K-pop and K-dramas, has added a different aspect of multiculturalism in
Korea. The global popularity of Korean popular media, referred to as the Korean Wave
(Hallyu), has operated as an additional force in attracting foreigners since the mid-2000s.
Hallyu is associated with the increased accessibility to digital media through which
globalized popular media are distributed. According to Yi (2016), these cultural and
media exports from Korea have exceeded $35 million in 86 countries in 2015, up from
$21.8 million in 2014. The majority of Korean wave fans are from the Asia-Pacific (26.2
million) followed by Africa and the Middle East, United States, and Europe (Yi, 2016).
Following this noticeable popularity, foreigners have become more interested in Korean
culture and visited Korea beyond just enjoying global popular media. To put plainly,
more foreigners with various motivations, purposes, and identities have moved into
Korean society as a result of this striking increase in popularity of Hallyu. This dynamic
change has diversified the demographic of immigrants in Korea in terms of jobs, gender,
age, and nationality in addition to the cheap migrant labour and/or foreign brides from
intra-Asia countries. Thus, Korean popular media as a cultural product is not only related
to Korean economic development, it also diversifies the influx of foreigners by attracting
people globally.
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More interestingly, as the number of international immigrants has increased,
Korean media has started to show more representations of foreigners in mass media.
Beyond exporting cultural products, Korean media reflects transnational changes by
showcasing foreign bodies on its own television shows like My neighbor is Charles, The
Settlement of Global Family, The Chatterbox of Beauties, and Non-summit etc. Different
from other television media such as news, soap operas, or documentaries, these
entertainment shows specifically lead audiences to enjoy a narrative of cultural
assimilation in Korean society (My neighbor is Charles and The Settlement of global
Family). In addition, some entertainment shows (The Chatterbox of Beauties and Nonsummit) are talk-shows with foreign guests who share their experiences of and opinions
on Korean culture. Given the myth of a racially and ethnically homogeneous country, the
increased visibility of foreigners in Korean media is a significant change. The increased
appearance of foreigners in media becomes actual evidence of the moment when Korean
society is at the stage of turning into a multicultural and globalized society. However, this
frequent visibility of foreigners in television media need to be understood through a
critical interpretation of media representation. Since media represent a selective image of
multicultural society in Korea, viewers are exposed to the processed image of immigrants
and multiculturalism without recognizing the difference between representation and
reality. More precisely, Koreans learn who are foreign others and how their multicultural
society looks through a lens of selective media representations. Accordingly, many
scholarly researches have investigated these selective representations and the effects of
reproducing differential images of foreigners. For instance, Korean researchers have
examined how television media otherize transnational identity by presenting particular
4

images of immigrants, and the extent Korean media reflect the multicultural reality of the
asymmetric division between well-educated foreigners and cheap labour immigrants
(Chae, 2010; Kim, Yu, & Kim, 2008; Son, 2015).
In this context, I aim to participate in the scholarly dialogue and specifically focus
on Non-summit, a famous Korean entertainment show, to explore media representations
of foreign identities in Korea. Non-summit is a Joongang Tongyang Broadcasting
Corporation (JTBC) show where there are ten to twelve transnational male panelists from
countries like Turkey, Ghana, China, Japan, German, France, Italy, Canada, Brazil, and
the United States, et al. In the show, foreign panelists lead a discussion in order to reach
agreement on global and local issues and participate as a representative of each country.
Among popular television entertainment shows in Korea, Non-summit offers a
particularly interesting space for exploration. Given the short period of
multiculturalization, it is hard to find a program in which Korean audiences see various
foreigners on a screen at the same time. Non-summit, however, provides a unique space
where foreign male panelists who have diverse identities in terms of race, ethnicity, and
class, gather together and actively join discussions. Through this show, Koreans not only
enjoy distinct perspectives from transnational identities about Korean society, but also
learn how these foreign panelists are different from poor immigrant workers and
uneducated foreign brides. When considering unique aspects of the show, I claim it is
interesting to analyze the interactive discussion among foreign panelists in order to
examine hierarchized relations of racial and gender identity among foreign panelists.
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By analyzing representations of foreign panelists in Non-summit, I examine how
transnational identities are racialized and gendered using a critical media textual analysis
of the show. Particularly, within the specific time and space of Korea, I:1) investigate
how foreign male characters in Non-Summit are racialized as a way of privileging White
foreign body, 2) analyze how foreign male characters in Non-Summit are gendered,
especially through highlighting the White heterosexual masculinity in the show, and
finally 3) unpack the ideological implication of media representations of transnational
identities in Non-Summit. These questions make it possible to answer questions such as
whose voices are more heard, which values are prioritized, and which groups are
disempowered or marginalized in this discourse among foreigners in Non-summit. In the
following section, I provide the overall information of Non-summit in order to
contextualize the certain space of Non-summit.
“It is Non-Summit” and “It is Abnormal”
To begin with, I start to address what it means and why it is crucial to analyze
media representation and discourse regarding foreign identities and multiculturalism. It is
significant to examine media representations because media play a crucial role in
building and distributing discourses of multiculturalism. According to Hall (1997),
representation is “an essential part of the process by which meaning is produced and
exchanged between members of a culture” (p.1), and representation is a practice and
meaning of material objects built on its symbolic function. Furthermore, according to
Straubhaar (2003), media operate to reproduce the dominant ideology that maintain
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power relations in local and global contexts as part of an ideological arena by circulating
media representations.
Through representation, members of a culture share meaning, language, and signs,
which are related to the discursive space of constructing identity. When reading a
transnational identity, we selectively ascribe a certain meaning within a specific time and
space. Since this certain meaning is already connected to the dominant discourse, the
ascribed meaning has to be understood as a regulation of identity. In this vein, examining
this particular show is important because as Washington (2012) notes “television, as a
tool for socialization, depends entirely on stereotypes to quickly and clearly express
mainstream notions regarding race, gender, class, and so on” (p.265). Besides, it is
possible to disclose the operation of racial, gender, and class domination by reading the
gap between what has been seen through and what has been hidden from media
representations (Kim, Yu, & Kim, 2009).
In addition, investigating media representation is necessary since media
significantly affect the pedagogical formation of understanding the self, others, and
society. As mentioned earlier, media represent foreign identities selectively to highlight a
particular group as positive and natural while erasing and marginalizing others. For
instance, selective images of light skinned foreigners sitting at coffee shops and doing
work on their laptops are represented whereas manual labourers in manufacturing or
agriculture are shown with darker skin if they are even represented in media. By being
exposed to the binary and stereotypical representation of dark skin and light skin
immigrants, audiences learn and internalize the racialized hierarchy in Korean society.
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Hence, selective representations as controlling images operate to infuse a certain ideology
of gender, race, class, and sexuality of a certain group, which further influences people’s
material experiences as well (Collins, 2004). Media pedagogy and its power to influence
knowledge production of multiculturalism impacts nation-states where the majority of
society is composed of a homogeneous ethnic and racial identity such as Korea (Kim &
Yoon, 2016). Thus, it is necessary to explore how Korean media represent transnational
identity differently and how the elective representation produce certain knowledge of
immigrants and multiculturalism. Specifically, through media, Koreans learn who
Koreans are, how Koreans interact with foreign others, and what Koreans can do with
foreign others by embracing certain knowledge (Sandlin & Maudlin, 2012).
Moreover, I center the critical reading of Foucault’s discourse by Stuart Hall
(2001b) in order to emphasize the entangled relation of representation, discourse, and
power. Discourse as a system of representation produces a certain knowledge, subjects,
and practice of knowledge in a particular historical time and space. By linking knowledge
and power, Foucault’s approach to discourse refuses the notion of absolute truth, but
rather claims that the discursive practice sustains a regime of truth entailing a specific
way of seeing and knowing that reality. The discursive practice is reproduced and
distributed by institutional apparatus and technologies. As an institutional apparatus,
media involve in production of specific discourse, which oftentimes functions as
surveillance over audiences. This approach of discourse and knowledge “helped to link
‘culture’ to ‘representation,’ and thus culture (and its hierarchies and relations of power)
to media texts which represent the world in the ‘information age’” (as cited in Hobbs,
2008). In this way, I explore what kind of discourse and knowledge of multiculturalism
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are produced in the current time and space of Korean society by analyzing racialized and
gendered representations in Non-Summit. Further, by doing so, it is possible to unravel
who is in power and has set the regime of truth that ultimately disciplines or disempowers
others.
Among popular television entertainment shows in Korea, Non-Summit presents a
particularly interesting space for examining racialized and gendered identities because of
the format of the show, main characteristics, noticeable popularity, and the prominent
visibility of racially varied characters on the show. Jang (2015) reported that the
popularity of Non-Summit is noticeable since Non-Summit is attracting many viewers and
this popularity is proven by a viewing rate over five percent. Its popularity is attributed to
the novel mode of a conference-style entertainment show and transnational characters in
the program. Each episode is about 75 minutes running time. According to the official
website of Non-Summit, the show’s purpose is to suggest creative solutions to discussion
topics of various issues in Korea. In every episode, ten to twelve foreign male panelists
discuss a weekly topic and vote on whether the topic should be considered “normal” or
“abnormal.” This discussion and voting process are particularly programmed to suggest
creative solutions to the problems that young Korean people currently face.
Non-Summit is based on the format of the G-20 summit. The G-20 summit is an
international forum for governments from twenty major countries that gather together to
discuss global issues. Non-Summit has a similar format. There are three Korean main
facilitators mediating the discussion. Every week different guests bring up a topic and
participate in the discussion as a representative of their own countries. Moreover, Non-
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Summit visualizes a particular setting of the program as a conference center to match with
the actual environment of G-20 summit. The title of program connotes two different
meanings in a creative way. Since the foreign characters are not official representatives
assigned by the government, the program title is named Non-Summit, which means it is
not the well-known official summit. The title Non-Summit also signifies the other
meaning translated as “being not normal” in Korean.1 Therefore, Non-Summit as the title
of an entertainment show clarifies it is not an official government meeting, so it is an
abnormal meeting. Additionally, the title also highlights how the foreign panelists vote on
whether topics are normal or abnormal, rather than it is supported or rejected.
In this context, it is interesting to think about the role of Koreans and foreign
characters within the particular format of the program and voting process of judging the
value of agenda. The Korean characters include the three chairmen who facilitate each
episode, and a weekly Korean guest who offers a topic for discussion. While foreign
participants are actively involved discussing global and local problems, the Korean
chairmen and the weekly guests occasionally involve themselves in the discussion but
mostly wait for the decision from international panelists. Thus, foreign characters are
mainly qualified to judge the value of agenda items in Non-Summit, and it is crucial to

1

Non-Summit (비정상회담) has two different meaning since the Korean title is

interpreted with the meaning of Chinese characters. 非正常 (비정상) means “being not
normal” and 非頂上 (비정상) means “not qualified as summit.”
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interrogate who has exercised their right to speak and whose voice is more heard than
others in this spatial context. In chapter two, I unpack how the format of program, title of
the show, and roles of characters are interconnected with each other to create and recreate
spatial power in Non-Summit.
In reference to the foreign participants in the show, the main panelists are all men
who have different jobs such as a student, singer, fashion model, lecturer, sales man, and
translator etc. In terms of complexion, it is hard to find “fully dark” characters except one
main character from Ghana. Most of characters in Non-Summit are lighter and/or White
characters, which sometimes does not match with the diverse demographics of a certain
nation. For instance, the representative of Brazil appeared in the show has visibly White
skin color. By showing a White body as representative of Brazil, other racially and
ethnically diverse identities are recognized as not qualified to represent the nation and are
erased in the show. The other interesting point of foreign participants in Non-Summit is
that most of them originally have had different jobs such as graduate students, marketing
consultant, and programmer. However, they switched their jobs to entertainer and
contracted with entertainment agencies since they have been on the show. It means that
their visibility as entertainers has stood out as they expand into other programs in Korean
media. However, in the context of Korea where the majority of immigrants consist of
foreign cheap labour and transnational brides, panelists in Non-Summit do not fully
reflect the demographics of immigration and multiculturalism in Korea.
Although Non-Summit has interesting aspects to be examined, little research has
explored Non-Summit as a cultural media text to analyze discourses of transnational
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identities multiculturalism in Korea. In one recent work, Kim and Yoon (2016) focused
on a controversial issue that happened in Non-Summit: the issue of Kimikayo. Kimikayo is
the national anthem of Japan and it is considered as a symbol praising Japan’s
imperialism among Korean audiences. When Non-Summit introduced a temporal
Japanese panelist in the 17th episode, Kimikayo was played as background music in the
program. This caused a huge backlash among Korean audiences who considered the
playing of Kimikayo as implicit praise of Japanese colonialism in Korea. In addition, Son
(2015) addressed the exclusively male centered representation of foreigners in NonSummit. The author highlighted how foreigners in Non-Summit, who are represented as
White-male characters, are framed as superior and ultimately criticized the global force
of neoliberalism and capitalism. Though she revealed the ambivalent aspect of
multiculturalism and homo-national identity in Korea, there are still binaries existing of
good/bad, legal/illegal, and helpful/damaging foreigners when it comes to sorting out
transnational identities.
There was also a positive reading of Non-Summit as a way of understanding other
cultures rather than forcing them to be assimilated into the dominant Korean social
structure (Park & Lee, 2015). By highlighting active participation of foreign panelists,
Park and Lee (2015) evaluated Non-Summit as an artificial society that Korean
multiculturalism aims for. While recognizing the academic contribution of these works, I
contend that the presence of the U.S. military base and transnational hierarchy operating
underneath the representations on the show are not fully discussed in previous works.
Rather, these works have focused on Korean nationalism to ascribe stereotypical
interpretations of foreigners in Non-Summit. This approach to transnational identities is
12

helpful to challenge Korean nationalism, but it is not critically associated with the
insidious but penetrating hegemonic power of Whiteness. Even if there is obvious
visibility of racially diverse identities, missing still is a space for analyzing discourses of
how the main characters are racialized and gendered based on their discursive interaction
with each other, particularly as a way of disempowering certain foreign identities in
Korea.
In sum, recognizing Non-Summit as a contested media space allows us to unravel
the dominant power operation in the show when representations of transnational identity
are selectively articulated to underlying social cultural assumptions. In this research, I
aim to deepen the understanding of media representation of racialized and gendered
identities by revealing the transnational operation of Whiteness in order to problematize
the visibility and discourse of naturalizing the White heterosexual male identity in NonSummit. In this burgeoning multicultural society, I suggest media representations of racial
and ethnic others construct the dominant ideology of Westernized White heterosexual
masculinity among Korean audiences, which reinforces a familiar global hierarchy within
certain time and space of Korean society.
Before delving into this research problem, it is helpful to provide a roadmap of
this thesis. The following section of the first chapter addresses the historical and
geopolitical spatial context of Korea. In doing so, I recognize Korean society not as a
fixed background, but as a dynamic, flexible, and negotiated space in which structured
contexts critically take part in identity formation. As aspects of spatial power in Korean
society, I underscore three aspects of Korean society: U.S. superiority, Anti
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Americanism, and gendered multiculturalism. The second section examines research on
postcolonial feminist theory as theoretical framework to challenge the centrality of
Westernized White patriarchal masculinity. Through this chapter, I demonstrate it is
essential to contextualize Non-Summit within the historical, social, and political space of
Korean society by centering U.S. military occupation. Furthermore, I argue a postcolonial
feminist framework is helpful to unpack the dominance of White, heteronormative, and
patriarchal ideologies produced by media representation of racialized and gendered
foreigners in Non-Summit.
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Chapter 1
Literature Review
Spatializing Korea as historical and geopolitical site
It is critical to have a contextual perspective to understand Korean society as
spatial configuration of power. As Shome (2003) notes, “how our approach to power may
benefit from a contextual and spatial focus where contexts are understood not as static
backgrounds but as dynamic relations of force” (p.54). In this section, I focus on space,
transnationalism, and identity derived from Shome’s works as defining main concepts
that provide historical, geopolitical, and cultural contexts for Korea and the formation of
transnational identity. I consider the identity formation is a process that a foreign identity
becomes hailed as a social subject in the multicultural Korean society. In addition, I
recognize the spatial context of Korea actively involves the formation of each
transnational identity distinctively and differentially. Hence, I understand spatializing as
the process of “radical contextualism” as argued by Nelson, Treichler, and Grossberg (as
cited in Shome, 2003, p.43) to unpack the deployment of power and to understand the
formation of cultural identity in a specific place and time. What I argue in this section is
that not only does spatializing make it possible to analyze Korean society as a
complicated space entangled in economic, geopolitical, and historical relations with other
countries, but also to emphasize how space is dynamically constructing the symbolic and
material condition of transnational identities.
I start to explain why spatialization of the globalized world is important to
understand the formation of transnational identities regarding to relations of power.
15

Sorrells (2010) referred to globalization as a complicated and contested concept with
multiple layered meanings of economic, political, and technological forces shaped by
particular beliefs and ideologies. Global interconnection has not been grounded on the
same power matrix, meaning that there are remaining vestiges of colonial history and
hierarchy between countries. In this globalized era, the increased interdependence of
nations and the development of technology seem to blur geographical nation borders by
accelerating the transnational mobility of cultural identities. However, these changes do
not seem to dim the binary perception especially between colonizer “West” and colonized
“non-West”. The increased mobility rather complicates the power configuration of the
global hierarchy because we now find the West in the non-West, simultaneously, the nonWest in the West. In other words, differentially privileged or marginalized cultural
identities are hard to be captured based on the geographical or collective understanding of
identities. For instance, Southeast Asian immigrants’ identity in Korea are differently
constructed in different spatial contexts such as manufacturing industry, fashion industry,
or academic environment because each space has different economic, political, and
cultural power configuration. Thus, it gets harder to fasten Southeast Asian immigrants as
a collective group of poor, underpaid, untidy, or working-class immigrants in Korea. In
this sense, it is more necessary to recognize a transnational identity in a certain time and
space, so as to capture the complex operation of spatial power and the different formation
of cultural identity in this globalization era.
More specifically, I argue identity depends on the space in which they are situated
and what kind of relationship or hierarchy they have within that particular space. It means
that space is relationally and contextually constructed, thus the understanding of space
16

enables us to recognize identity as historically rooted, contextually produced, and
ideologically contested (Sekimoto, 2014; Shome & Hegde, 2002a), not as one monolithic
cultural identity. For instance, Shome (2003) pointed out that the power configuration of
space in the U.S.-Mexico border region and demonstrated how this space reproduces a
particular material reality to empower or disempower individual and/or collective
identity, in particular immigrants. In this work, Shome (2003) showed how the identity of
immigrants are produced by surveillance technologies, authoritative guardians, and
border checking practices. Particularly, Shome (2003) claimed it is hard to capture how
spatial power influences the empowerment of immigrants’ identities, without knowing
about the cumulated historical and political context of U.S.-Mexico border. This
understanding illustrates space is not a geographical or physical place in which the
surveillance process of border checking occurs, but space is discursively and
ideologically shaped so functions as a medium of production, organization, and
distribution of power.
Based on this understanding of space and identity, I start to spatialize Korean
society as a complex and contested site of global and local power in order to examine the
identity formation of foreign panelists in Non-Summit. Particularly, I focus on the U.S.
military occupation, thus aim to expose the constructed preference for a White Western
heterosexual male identity in Korea. Indeed, the current military occupation by the U.S.
Army needs to be understood as one factor of spatialization of Korean society when it
comes to identity formation of transnational identities in Korea. Since 1945, U.S. military
bases have occupied Korea physically and ideologically. Under the intervention of the
U.S. military after World War II, Koreans have developed the notion of the United States
17

as a supporter for the economy and national defense in Korea. Inevitably, this asymmetric
power hierarchy between the U.S. and Korea has shaped the contemporary neocolonial
relationship. Within the market logic of neoliberalism, Korea’s dependence on the U.S.
has been more accelerated. Neoliberalism, the logic of economic liberalism, free trading,
and privatization has forced the Korean government to participate in this hierarchized
economic and political relationship. Thus, spatializing Korean society pertaining to the
U.S. military occupation is significant to demonstrate the neocolonial relation between
two countries. With this hierarchized national relation, it is not hard to imagine Koreans
have shaped one’s racial logic and racial hierarchy based on the perception of White
America cultivated in Korea via the physical and symbolic presence of U.S. Army bases.
In the following section, major themes are navigated to spatialize Korean society:
notions of U.S. superiority, Anti-Americanism, and gendered multiculturalism. By
centering the U.S. military occupation as an important axis of producing ideological
power in Korea, I intend to reveal Korean society not as a static background but as a
dynamic relation of identity formation among foreign panelists in Non-Summit. First, the
historical and cultural dominance of the U.S. armed forces is delineated to point how
White or light skinned foreigners have taken a favorable position than dark skinned
foreigners, which pertains to constructing the ideology of Whiteness in Korea. Second, I
demonstrate how the sociocultural context frames the gendered structure regarding
immigration and multiculturalism. Through examining the gendered structure, I divulge
the paternalistic attitude of Korean society to immigrants from developing countries.
Based on this spatialization, I consider Korean society as an already racialized and
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gendered space in which Non-Summit is constructed as a particular media space that
favors light skinned, heteronormative, and masculine foreign identities.
Whiteness as a dominant ideology in Korean society
Whiteness is a monster that keeps changing its figure to disguise its real being. It
means that Whiteness is not a fixed, perpetual, and explicit concept, but keeps changing
its being strategically to save the centrality. Therefore, to capture and territorialize its
temporal existence, many scholars have uncovered the discursive strategy of becoming
Whites as well as the sociopolitical structure of individual identity, interpersonal
interactions, and media representations (Dyer, 2008; Frankenberg, 1993; Hughey, 2010;
Jackson II, 1999; Nakayama & Krizek, 1995; Nakayama & Martin, 1999). Based on
these critical works, many key strategies of camouflaging Whiteness were found:
Whiteness as invisibility, universality, unlabeled territoriality, and normativity. As
acknowledging these scholarly contributions, I center the U.S. military occupation to
understand the temporal being of Whiteness in Korea. I contend that the current strategy
of Whiteness has become complicated by the tension between the U.S. superiority and
Anti-Americanism in Korea. However, Whiteness has still lingered in Korean society as a
superior and dominant concept, but more culturally and ideologically structured. To
examine how Whiteness has operated in Korean society, I focus on two major strategies
of Whiteness in Korea: (1) Whiteness as a socially, historically, and culturally structured
dominant ideology and (2) Whiteness as a strategic rhetoric to sustain its central
territoriality by deploying representations of non-Whites. These two major aspects
explain not only how Whiteness has been developed and interwoven with the presence of
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U.S. military occupation in Korea, but also how the strategic center of Whiteness has to
do with the projecting non-Whites’ undesirable and otherized representations.
Accordingly, I begin to elaborate on the being-ness of Whiteness: Whiteness as
socially, historically, and culturally structured superiority in the spatial context of Korea.
Drawing on Cho (2008), the Korean War provided the explicit moment in which the U.S.
military base physically and ideologically occupied the Southern part of Korean
peninsula. It was also the explicit moment that the U.S. became bluntly involved in
Korea’s economy, politics, and culture even more than after the Second World War. The
presence of the U.S. Army bases oftentimes has been articulated as “militarized
humanitarianism” to provide supplies and save poor Asian adoptees after the second
World War (Pate, 2014). However, the U.S. Army base in Korea became the first place in
which the United States set up an anticommunist government following World War II. As
well, the U.S. military occupation has been explained as neocolonialism breaking up big
colonized countries into manageable small states to make them depend on the prior
imperial hegemonic power to defend themselves (Kwon, 2016). Thus, the U.S. military
occupation has continued this neocolonial practice since Korean society is in the
geopolitical condition of “a permanent state of war temporarily suspended.” Besides, the
Korean government has highlighted this dangerous geopolitical condition Koreans live in
to justify why we need the military protection from the United States (Cho, 2008, p.93).
Since the democratic government has acknowledged the indispensable occupation of U.S.
military bases in Korea by referring to our geopolitical situation of armistice, it explicitly
reveals the hierarchical relationship that we (Korea) are in with them (the United States).
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Therefore, it seems Korean society has reentered the different and new colonial
relationship with the U.S. after retrieving the independence from Japanese colonialism.
In this U.S. militarized context, I argue Whiteness has been historically and
geopolitically constructed with a primary perception that the United States is superior and
Whiteness also operates through putting the White racial identity as standard mode of
knowing the U.S. (Kim, 2006). For instance, after the Korean war, Korean media, as well
as U.S. media, particularly produce and circulate representations of a certain identity of
U.S. Army to circulate the humanitarian and/or supportive American military image. By
projecting White, heterosexual, masculine, and humanitarian soldiers as natural, positive,
and good foreigners in Korea, media representations have distributed images of White
America into Korean society. Furthermore, the current circulation of global popular
media continues to reproduce representations of White racial identities as a standard
foreign identity. The increasing circulation of globalized popular media has extended a
territory of Whiteness to the cultural, social, and ideological aspects of Korean society by
distributing specific media representations to mass audience in the globe. According to
Kim (2005; 2011), the global world of television media, particularly U.S. popular media,
have distributed individualism, cosmopolitanism, and gender egalitarianism as a Western
invention. In response, Korean women realized Korean society is not “liberal” or “equal”
enough compared to Western countries (Kim, 2005). This response shows Korean
women accepted the ideology of individualism, cosmopolitanism, and gender
egalitarianism not as a simple message of global television, but as a standard of value.
When Korean women were exposed to the Westernized ideology, they considered the
traditional and cultural value of Korean society as less desirable than those values of
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Western society. Through this process, Korean women internalized Western values as a
better or advanced one, which is also associated to the hierarchal relationship between the
U.S. and Korea. This indicates the difference between Korean and U.S. society is
interpreted within the context of global hierarchy, implicitly implanting ideological
superiority of the Western value among Koreans.
In this hierarchized relation, it is necessary to refer to the way in which
hegemonic masculinity has been developed in Korea. The U.S. military occupation
replaced defective masculinity of Korean men with the desired masculinity of White U.S.
troops. Sending military troops demonstrates that it is deficient for Korean masculinity to
protect its own country. Not only the militarized masculinity of White U.S. Americans, as
what Eguchi (2009) noted, the hegemonic masculinity of White men as “the culturally
idealized form of masculine character” is inextricably highlighted in Korea. For example,
the case of celebrity Daniel Henny, a mixed-race actor (White and Korean), was often
cited to reveal how Korean media portrayal of light skinned celebrity is articulated as
cosmopolitan, modern, liberal, and nice-looking (Lo & Kim, 2011). As hegemonic
masculinity, White U.S. American men have been privileged as an admired paternal
position, which reveals the gendered relation between the masculinized U.S. (a dominant
and benevolent supporter) and the feminized Korea (victimized and need to be revitalized
from war). However, I claim Koreans have not been only passive or victimized by this
asymmetric power operation of the U.S. military occupation, but also resistant or
insubordinate. By providing examples of historical conflict between the U.S. military
bases and Koreans, I argue there has been mixed recognition of U.S. military occupation
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among Koreans, but the ideology of U.S. superiority still remains and operates in and
through Korean society.
After the fierce pro-democracy movement for 32 years, the civilian government
has operated in Korea since 1993. The democratic-movement generation is different from
the Korean-war generation in dealing with social issues in Korea, especially regarding
U.S. military bases. There have been several nationally recognized issues of homicide
cases, sexual crimes, prostitution, and environmental pollution around the U.S. military
bases (Hughes, Chon, & Ellerman, 2007; Kim, 2002; Kim & Hur, 2009; Moon, 2007).
Kim and Hur (2009) and Moon (2007) referred the murder of Shin Hyosun and Sim
Misun by a U.S. armored vehicle in June 2002 as a significant case that exposed the
unequal relationship and led to a massive candlelight protest in Korea. Although the
armored vehicle killed two teenage girls, the soldiers were found not-guilty by the U.S.
military court of “negligent homicide.” In addition, the sexual crimes and prostitution
happening around the U.S. military base have been long-term issues for almost six
decades. The case of the vicious murder of Yun Geumi who was killed by the drunken
serviceman, Kenneth Markle, became a symbolic case to reveal Korea’s “powerless[ness]
and victimization” by the U.S. (Kim & Hur, 2009). These two outrageous cases happened
due to the Status Of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which is an agreement between a host
country and a foreign country stationing military occupations. The treaty states that the
Korean government and judiciary cannot punish these servicemen if the U.S. government
requires extraditing them from Korea. In response to these brutal cases, Koreans started
to confront the power of the U.S. military bases by candlelight vigils with more than a
million citizens. This collective action protesting against crimes and inadequate reaction
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from the U.S. has been considered as Anti-Americanism (Kim, 2002; Kim & Hur, 2009).
Anti-Americanism includes not only candlelight vigils but also boycott campaigns
against products of U.S. companies and political activism via social media. Situated
opposite this ideology of U.S. superiority, Anti-Americanism is read as a counterhegemonic movement against the U.S. military occupation, an unfair alliance
relationship, and abusive economic and political power over Korea.
However, I found the counter-hegemony is not entirely fulfilled since the cultural
and ideological domination, which are insidiously prevalent among Koreans, are not fully
recognized, questioned and challenged. More precisely, some Koreans still idealize the
modernity, superpower military, capital, and cultural exceptionalism of the U.S. whereas
some of them negatively evaluate and criticize problematic reactions from the U.S.
military bases and government. For instance, “country in the heaven (Cheonjoguk)” is a
newly-coined word created by online users to praise the United States in which citizens
are privileged to enjoy the strongest national defense power and sufficient capital. This
neologism basically means the U.S. government spends quadrillion dollars as a national
defense budget, and it is usually compared to “Hell-Joseon” which is coined in order to
despise the Korean government and socioeconomic inequality. When these two newlycoined words are used together in order to compare the two countries and each neologism
satirizes different aspects of society, Koreans hierarchized the U.S. (country in the
heaven) over Korea (country like a hell). Hence, the hierarchized relation between the
U.S. and Korea still linger around the discourse of military power, capital, and
advancement of the U.S. among Koreans. The Anti-American fever denounces the
abusive force of the U.S. government, however, it still holds the ideological hierarchy
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within capitalism and neoliberalism sustaining the global power of the U.S. In this
context, I acknowledge ambivalent recognitions of the U.S. military occupation among
Koreans between the militarized humanitarianism and Anti-Americanism. Hence, it is
important to examine how the global popular media have reproduced White dominated
ideology in this spatialized context of Korean society.
Necessarily, it is essential to investigate how the undesirable representations of
non-Whites have been employed to sustain dominance of the White heterosexual male as
favorable foreign identities in Korean society. This connects to the second point of
Whiteness in this section: Whiteness as a strategic rhetoric to sustain its central
territoriality by deploying representations of non-Whites. Media representations have
been examined and criticized as a way of reproducing Whiteness by centering it as a
desirable and natural norm (Nakayama & Krizek, 1995). By exploring media and popular
culture as a learning process of how to be “White” and what is considered normal, Shome
(2000) highlighted the critical issue of “how” media produce Whiteness rather than
whether media and popular culture do produce Whiteness. In order to answer this issue of
“how” media produce Whiteness, thre strategic deployment of representations of nonWhites has been interrogated to uncover Whiteness operating visibly or invisibly
(Dubrofsky, 2006; Griffin, 2015; Oh, 2012; Shome, 1996). According to Nakayama &
Krizek (1995), the strategic rhetoric of Whiteness is a practice to resecure the center
rather than is a place itself, and non-Whites are strategically constructed and deployed to
maintain the invisible territory of Whiteness. For instance, Oh (2012) noted how White
privileged masculinity is protected by the binary pole of blackness and yellowness in the
film, Rush Hour. By drawing a fence around hypersexualized black masculinity and the
25

asexual Asian/American eunuch, the White masculinity is sustained as natural and
universal. Additionally, women of color have been represented or marked as undesirable
partners for marriage or dating, and sometimes media portray them as a backdrop to
sustain White femininity on television (Dubrofsky, 2006). Thus, these studies revealed
stereotypical representations of non-Whites are utilized and otherized in order to place
Whiteness as a taken-for-granted natural or normal centrality.
In the context of Korean media, the strategic deployment of non-White
immigrants happens with classification of foreigners in Korea. Usually, non-White
immigrants have been represented as lower-class labour and threatening others (Kim, Yu,
& Kim, 2009) while White immigrants are projected as “superior foreigners” (Son,
2015). In this regard, Ju and No (2013) categorized foreigners in three groups based on
stereotypical representations of foreign others in Korean television media: (1) longing
group (foreign people from the U.S. and Europe countries), (2) nearby group (Japan and
China), and (3) compassionate group (Vietnam, Philippines, and Uzbekistan). These three
groups explicitly show how Koreans asymmetrically classify foreign others: Firstly, it is
significant to see the difference between the longing group and the compassionate group.
Each group is comprised of countries based on the cultural, ideological, and geographical
binary perception. This classification is fundamentally preoccupied by the global
hierarchy between First worlds and Third worlds, which is also shown in the groups’
titles. Thus, foreigners from Western countries, specifically the White culture, are
categorized as a group that Koreans long for. On the contrary, foreigners from Southeast
and Central Asian countries, who have dark-skinned bodies, are considered as a group of
people that Koreans take care of. More interestingly, when it comes to the Nearby group
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including Japan and China, the title of this group more stresses on the geographic
approach. This approach seems to say that Koreans do not demarcate or discriminate
people from East Asia countries. Koreans seem to accept people from East Asian
countries, who have similar appearance to Koreans, considering them as neighbors.
However, it is contradicted by the fact that Chinese and ethnic Koreans living and
coming from China are easily stigmatized as criminals and underpaid as illegal labourers
in Korea. (Lee, 2017)
Additionally, this type of classification was also found in what Kim, Yu, and Kim
(2009) highlight as representations of racialized and gendered class of foreigners in
Korea. Kim, Yu, and Kim (2009) furthered this categorization and analyzed it as the
structural problem of a global labour market. By investigating representations of
multiculturalism, they found how working class foreign labourers are described as poor,
dark-skinned, illegal, negligent, and threatening, thus need to be well assimilated in a
host country to show their value. On the contrary, Western figured foreigners are often
represented as proud, sophisticated, and professional people, thus we Koreans learn from
and long for them. It is significant in that these works exposed differential attitude toward
foreigners in Korea, which implicitly informs the preference of Westernized identity.
Furthermore, this racially differentiated representation needs to be situated within the
feminization of global division of labour system, in order to reveal the process of
otherizing region, gender, race, and class (Kim, Yu, and Kim, 2009). This analysis
obviously furthered the categorization of foreigners in Korea by putting them in the
globally structured context of gender, race, and class. However, I argue this research still
reproduces the binary perception between the rich North and the poor South. Both articles
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mentioned above demonstrate how these classified groups are successfully deployed to
sustain the supremacy of Whiteness in Korea. Hence, I argue the deployment of nonWhite representation is more based on the group identity of foreigners in Korean media.
By representing the group of immigrants from developing countries as compassionate
one, Korean media situates the Westernized foreign identities at the higher or preferred
position of the global hierarchy.
Gendered multiculturalism in Korea
As illustrated in the earlier section, I explained that multiculturalism in Korea has
been deployed to minimize domestic problems such as a lack of manufacturing workers
and low marriage rate in rural area. International marriages with women from developing
countries have increased due to “marriage squeeze – a shortage of marriageable women
in rural areas - caused by the widening cultural and economic gap between rural and
urban areas” (Kim, 2010, p.720). As Oh (2016) stated, the percentage of international
marriages in rural areas takes 22.7% of all marriages from 2011 to 2015, and most
international marriages are between Korean men and foreign women. Most foreign brides
are imported from developing Asian countries, principally, Vietnam, Philippines,
Thailand, Mongolia, and China into relatively developed countries, such as South Korea,
Japan, and Singapore. To put it bluntly, women from developing countries serve as
unpaid labours for reproduction and domestic affairs. Foreign brides are mostly available
for certain groups of Korean men, such as for “never-married men in rural areas and
previously married (divorced or widowed) or disabled men of ‘low socio-economic
status’ in urban areas” (Lim, 2010, p.66). This already gendered nature of marriage
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migration has reinforced patriarchy, heteronormativity, feminized migration policy, and
furthers the hierarchal structure in Korea.
Along with this gendered marriage migration, transnational women are
represented differently based on their racialized bodies in Korean media. Mainstream
media and popular cultural products, particularly in entertainment reality shows, have
circulated the representation of sexualized, assimilative, and racialized foreign women
identity in Korea. (Beak & Hwang, 2009; Kim, Park, & Lee, 2009; Oh & Oh, 2015). It is
not surprising to see how representations of foreign women are utilized to maintain
gendered migration and Whiteness in Korea. For instance, there are two well-known
television programs: The Chatterbox of Beauties and Love in Asia. These two programs
depicted foreign women in a similar and different way. Love in Asia was programmed to
show international marriage mostly between Korean men and foreign brides, and most of
foreign brides were from developing countries. In order to maximize their “true” love,
Love in Asia focused on the hardship that they faced in Korea society. At the end of most
stories, the Korean husband and mother-in-law visited the family in the foreign bride’s
home country to understand her situation with true empathy. On the contrary, The
Chatterbox of Beauties had a bevy of foreign beauties and mainly female foreign guests
talked about various issues in Korea such as, campus culture, dating culture, pregnancy,
and food etc. Different from foreign brides shown in Love in Asia, women guests in The
Chatterbox of Beauties were fluent in Korean, well-educated, and came from various
countries, but there was a difference of popularity between Western guests and nonWestern guests (Kim, Park, & Lee, 2009). These two media representations reproduced a
binary perception between educated women from Western countries and foreign brides in
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rural areas from the Third World. As well, all transnational women represented in both
programs were sexualized and consumed by Korean men in different ways. Further,
through this representation of transnational women, Korean society maintains the
paternalistic position on immigrant women by encouraging them to overcome cultural
differences (Love in Asia) or by consuming foreign women’s ideas on already gendered
topics as an entertainment factor (The Chatterbox of Beauties).
The gendered multicultural pathways of Korea are also expanded to the
paternalized assimilation approach toward working immigrants, in particular those that
are categorized as a “compassionate group” from developing countries (Ju & No 2013).
Paternalized family refers to as hierarchical power of man who has control over a family
for protecting the weaker and feminized subjects and pass on the man’s family name to
keep his family line. Thus, paternalized assimilation addresses the power of a host
country, referred to as paternity, over foreign immigrants, referred as newly adopted
children. Since immigrants need to secure their legal status, they should follow and
assimilate into the system and rule of the host country (Oh & Oh, 2015). The discourse of
assimilation has been underscored to erase the fear of losing racial and ethnical
homogeneity by government and popular media. However, the paternalistic assimilation
approach has been applied inconsistently. According to Oh and Oh (2015), Korea’s
neocolonial relationship to the United States makes Koreans situate themselves “along a
neocolonial axis that privileges the United States as a paternal site from which
recognition and acceptance is desired” (p.260). Indeed, the paternalized assimilation
discloses not only the gendered multicultural system of Korean society, but also
hierarchizes global relations among countries.
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In this context, it is significant to rethink the tagline of Non-Summit: “The global
youth gather together for the peaceful and blissful future in the globe.” Among the
diverse transnational identities in Non-Summit, I call for critical attention on the malecentered panelists in the show. At first look, the overt visibility of male dominant
characters in the show explicitly reveals the male-centered space of Non-Summit. In order
to challenge the male-centered characters, Son’s research (2015) highlighted the work of
gendered multiculturalism by comparing Non-Summit to The Chatterbox of Beauties in
terms of discussion topics, target audience, and the format of programs. For instance, in
The Chatterbox of Beauties, foreign women are chosen by a main male host to speak, and
as the main audience, Korean men consume the sexualized femininity of the foreign
women from the show. In Non-Summit, however, foreign male panelists freely raise their
hands to participate in discussion, and Korean women consume the neoliberal and
cosmopolitan masculinity of foreign panelists as main viewers (Son, 2015). Son’s work
(2015) also criticized Non-Summit as reinforcing the male privilege that entitles them to
be representatives of their country and talk about political issues to make the world
better. However, analyzing how White masculinity is privileged in Non-Summit is still
needed. Besides, it is crucial to reveal how this White masculinity reproduces the
gendered and racialized identity of foreign panelists by otherizing non-White
masculinity. Put it another way, examination of transnational panelists is needed to see
gendered representations and discourses in Non-Summit so as to address what is
considered a dominant and desirable paternalized masculinity in Korea.
In sum, I spatialized Korean society by centering the U.S. military occupation in
order to address the ideologically constructed favor of White and masculine foreign
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identities, based on the dominant ideology of U.S. superiority. Through this section, I
found that the current strategic being of Whiteness is the privileged identity, culture, and
ideology in Korea as a way of prioritizing White or light skinned foreigners. As well, I
recognized foreigners are classified and grouped as a collective identity; a group of
immigrants from developing countries is degraded to reinforce a group of Westernized
identity as the favorable one in Korea. Additionally, I knew gendered multiculturalism is
differently applied to different racial bodies, and Non-Summit is already a gendered space
with dominant visibility of male foreign panelists. By foregrounding ideologies of U.S.
superiority, Anti Americanism, and gendered multiculturalism in Korea, I finally
highlight the significance of examining Non-summit as a specific media space in which
intersecting identities of foreign panelists are deliberately utilized to sustain the privilege
of White heterosexual masculinity.
However, I deny the categorization or binary perception between the poor and the
rich foreigners. This is because the binary categorization hardly capture how individual,
dark skinned, and foreign identities are differently and delicately utilized to sustain the
centrality of Whiteness in certain time and space. Further, this binary division neglects
the intersecting power dynamics within the same categorized group. Hence, I emphasize
analyzing individual foreign identities with the intersection of race, class, gender,
nationality, and ethnicity, which allows me to highlight the complex operation of White
dominated ideology in Korean society. Spatializing Korean society is a starting point of
this thesis to make a connection to apply the feminist theoretical framework for analyzing
Non-Summit as a mediated text. Starting from shedding light on the male-centered and
White-dominant foreign representations in Non-Summit, I argue that the postcolonial
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feminist theoretical approach is required to challenge the White heterosexual male
dominant representation of transnational identity in Korea.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework
Postcolonial Feminism Theoretical Framework
By drawing on feminist critique as a theoretical lens, I analyze racialized and
gendered transnational identities in Non-Summit, so that it unravels the glocalized
dominance of White heterosexual male representation in Korea. Feminist theory has
evolved and branched out in many directions. Although each theory has different
directions and foci, generally, the feminist theoretical framework has been applied to
challenge social norms constructed and maintained by the dominant ideology of gender
hierarchy and patriarchal hegemony. By problematizing the dominant hegemony,
feminist theory re-situates marginalized groups to the center and provides counterhegemonic narratives from nondominant voices (Calafell, 2012; Griffin, 2014; Kim,
2008; Ong, 1999; Shome, 2006; Shome, 2011a).
Particularly, intersectionality derived from Black feminist theory (Collins, 2000;
Collins & Bilge, 2016; Collective, 1982; Crenshaw, 1989) has opened up the space for
examining “how power relations are interwoven and mutually constructing; race, class,
gender, sexuality, dis/ability, ethnicity, nation, religion, and age are categories of
analysis, terms that reference important social division” (Collins & Blige, 2016, p.7). The
intersected understanding of women’s oppression is significant since each woman’s
oppression is differently hailed from multidirectional systemic inequality “tied to the
contemporary economic and political position” of certain racial, class, gender, sexual,
ethnic, and national identity (Collective, 1977, p.213). This critically nuanced
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understanding of gender oppression allows us to rethink monolithic and homogenous
representations of womanhood in the globalized context. As well, intersectionality brings
alternative women’s experiences and voices into this problematic monolithic
representation to push against the underlying White-centered feminist inference. Along
with the assumption that every woman experiences womanhood differently,
intersectionality has to be utilized in a radical contextualization. Furthermore, the
localized femininity and masculinity also have to be considered within certain historical,
economic, and sociopolitical power contexts for the sheer utilizing of different
womanhood. If not, it still ironically excludes other people who are experiencing
differential marginalization in terms of race, sexuality, ability, ethnicity, class, and
nationality in a specific time and space.
To do so, this research aims to employ the postcolonial feminist framework for
challenging not only Whiteness but also hegemonic masculinity in Korean popular media
in order to reveal how “unequal global relations of culture and economy continually
articulate the politics of gender in any local context, and how local relations are always at
work in macro global processes.” (Shome, 2006, p.255). The postcolonial perspective has
centered on the interrelated history of colonial domination, inequality, and injustice to
address the fact that millions of people still consider and acknowledge something from
the West as taken for granted or normative (Young, 2012). As what Spivak (1988)
affirmed, knowledge about the Third world has been always associated with the political
and economic interests of the west, and in particular for the Western audience.
Ultimately, the objective of postcolonialism has to do with “a wide-ranging political
project to reconstruct knowledge formations, reorient ethnical norms, turn the power
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structure of world upside down…” (Young, 2012, p.9). Thus, I contend that having a
postcolonial perspective is to cast a doubt on the Western-centered knowledge production
and to deconstruct the discursive colonization of the non-Western others.
Given this context, the underlying assumption of the postcolonial feminist is that
all women do not experience the same womanhood and gender hierarchy in a specific
time and space, but there are still vestiges of colonialism operating in and through
nations, cultures, economics, and desires which remain asymmetrically connected.
Unpacking continuing legacies of colonialism around the globe, postcolonial feminists
have problematized the representations of women in the “Third World” as a process of
“Othering” by dominant Western feminism (Mohanty, 1998; 2003). Frequently, the
process of otherizing Third world women accompanies centering White femininity as a
desired femininity. For instance, Shome (2011a) noted that how representational logics
articulate White women as global mothers, and critically analyzed how such
representations reproduce the transnational formation of Whiteness overall.
Furthermore, I argue the postcolonial feminist approach provides more critically
nuanced attention to transnational contexts because it denies a monolithic identity of
Third World women but insists instead on “the specificities of race, class, nationality,
religion, and sexualities that intersected with gender, and the hierarchies epistemic as
well as political, social, and economic that exist among women” (Mishra, 2013, p.131).
Thus, postcoloniality is inherently connected to the intersected interpretation of
womanhood in the Third world since intersectionality reveals the multi-faceted
construction of systematic oppression of race, class, gender, and sexuality (Eguchi &

36

Washington, 2016; Griffin, 2014). As well, intersectionality is not only a tool to
investigate the layered oppressions of subordinate subjects but also used to problematize
dominance such as Whiteness and class privilege, or in-group racialization of gender
(Bilge & Denis, 2010). Thus, by decolonizing and reorienting feminism (Mohanty, 2003),
postcolonial feminists divulge the multi-directed operation of power, problematize the
politics of gender, and ultimately challenge the Westernized White patriarchal
heterosexual centrality which is historically constructed and permeated as a normative
referent globally.
In this regard, it is critical to utilize the postcolonial feminist frame as a
decolonizing and counter-hegemonic approach to analyze Non-Summit because Shome
and Hegde (2002b) noted postcoloniality “theorizes not just colonial conditions but why
those conditions are what they are and how they can be undone and redone” (p.250). As
mentioned earlier, the geopolitical space of Korea is imbricated with the asymmetrical
and uneven relationship with U.S. military occupation. In order to address and theorize
the neocolonial condition and what it is in Korea, it is imperative to understand locally
constructed militarization of the U.S. Army bases, White heterosexual normativity and its
implications for thinking gender in Korea. By acknowledging the production of discourse
is a process of controlling, selecting, organizing, and distributing knowledge to discipline
social subjects with dominant ideology (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008), I argue in
this thesis that there is a certain implicated hegemonic discourse of White heterosexual
normativity operating in and through representations of gendered and racialized identity
in Non-Summit. Further this discourse occurs within the complex interconnected power
between the U.S militarization, gendered multiculturalism, and racial formation in Korea.
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Therefore, finding how the neocolonial condition has been constructed by media
representations to distribute certain discourse is the first step to undo the hegemonic
ideology of White heterosexual normativity. I claim that postcolonial feminist theory
allows us to analyze racialized and gendered representations in Non-Summit within a
neocolonial spatial context of the U.S. military occupation in Korea. In this way, NonSummit becomes a media space in which the representation of White heterosexual
normativity is reproduced and distributed by the transnational identities selectively
represented in the show. Therefore, the postcolonial feminist theoretical approach takes
into account what is a possibly cumulative effect and power of these representations, and
how the knowledge of normativity produced by media affects the global hegemonic
ideology, and how different racial, national, gender, sexual, and ethnic groups are
depicted differentially in this transnational context.
In summary, I explore the Whiteness and hegemonic masculinity through an
examination of the representation of racialized and gendered transnational identity in
Non-Summit. In doing so, I unpack the global and local power deployment of White
hegemonic masculinity in the context of transnational space in Korea. For the data
collection, I focus on episodes from the first season since there are some consistencies
found in reference to main foreign characters in the show. For example, foreign male
panelists have been significantly changed after the first season. For analysis, six episodes
are selectively chosen based on viewing rate and sorted out based on global and local
issues. More precisely, three episodes are selected based on agenda items related to
global issues including key words such as discrimination, racism, multiculturalism, and
global media etc. The other three episodes are picked based on agenda items related to
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local issues such as domestic employment, love relationships, and domestic political
issues. Those different episodes are sorted out depending on titles of these episodes and
the overall content of discussion after viewing all episodes from the first season. For
instance, in episode 7, the discussion topic is “Marriage” and it is confusing whether this
topic is considered a local or global issue. However, the overall content is basically
criticizing the culture of marriage or love relationships in Korea. Thus, I decided to
analyze this episode as a local issue rather than a global one. Dividing topics into global
and local category is useful in two ways. First, it helps to examine how White,
heteronormative, and hegemonic masculinity is articulated as an universal truth or norm
through the discourse of global issues in Non-Summit. Second, it also demonstrates how
this “universal” value is centered to discuss localized issues, particularly within Korean
society, in a judgmental way. However, I acknowledge it is hard to say there is sorely
local issues because every issue is always already globalized in this transnational media
context. Providing more information on methodology, I address data collection and
research design in chapter two.
As for the further direction of this thesis, specifically, I investigate:1) how foreign
male characters in Non-Summit are racialized within the spatiality of power in Korea
where the U.S. military occupation is visibly and invisibly operating, 2) how foreign male
characters in Non-Summit are racially gendered, especially through highlighting the
hegemonic masculinity in the show, and finally 3) the ideological implications of media
representations of transnational identities in Non-Summit within the particular spatial
context of Korea. By doing so, I unpack how Whiteness and gendered multiculturalism
are reproduced in Korea, then connecting it to problematize White heterosexual
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masculine representations in Korean media as a process of reproducing epistemology of
Westernized ideology in Korea. In chapter two, analysis of the program gives details and
explanations of Non-Summit as a global entertainment show and its production process,
along with research problems guiding my work, key concepts driving this research, and
the data collection procedure. Chapter three is an analysis of my findings and a
discussion through the postcolonial feminist theoretical frame to challenge racialized and
gendered representations in Non-Summit. The last section, chapter four tie all of the
analyses together in order to demonstrate how Non-Summit reproduces the U.S.
superiority and European Whiteness by distancing Asian value by discussing postracial
and postgender ideologies implicitly reproduced in Non-Summit.
Ultimately, through this thesis, I expect to contribute to the field of
communication, critical cultural studies, and Korean media studies in two main ways.
First, by conducting research representations of racialized and gendered identities in
Korean media, I illuminate dynamic and messy intersections of transnational identities in
Korean society to rearticulate a cultural identity not as a monolithic but as an intersecting
and complicated representations. Second, this research fills gaps in the field of
transnational communication studies because it focuses on the analyses of racialized and
gendered representations and its meaning making to reproduce Whiteness and hegemonic
masculinity by Korean popular media. Most of the research conducted thus far focuses on
how Korean nationalism impacts multicultural discourses in Korea through analyzing
representations of foreign identities. This investigation thus opens new avenues for
understanding racialized and gendered representations of foreign identities constructed by
transnational Whiteness to highlight the broad operation of dominant hegemony.
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Ultimately, in this thesis, I not only reveal the identity formation of foreigners in Korea,
but also highlights how this formation, in turn, shapes the cultural identity of Koreans in
this globalized era.

41

Chapter 3
Methodology
In the previous chapter, I contextualized Korean society as a historically and
geopolitically contested space in which transnational identities are differentially
hierarchized in terms of race and gender. Built on the previous literature review, this
section focuses on the methodological approach, development of research questions, and
the detailed program information. In this thesis, I apply critical textual analysis to
examine the discursive strategy of representations of transnational panelists in NonSummit, so as to call a critical attention to the dominant ascendancy of White
heterosexual masculinity operating in and through the show. To begin, this chapter
delineates the research questions, key concepts, and a concept of textual analysis in order
to clarify the direction of this study. Then, detailed information of the program is
addressed, particularly focusing on the production process, foreign panelists, and
controversial issues related to the production crews or panelists in the show.
Research Questions
1) How are foreign male characters in Non-Summit racialized within the media text?
2) How are foreign male characters in Non-Summit gendered, especially through
highlighting the hegemonic masculinity in the show?
3) What are the ideological implications of media representations of transnational
identities in Non-Summit within the particular spatial context of Korea?
Key concepts
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Based on the research questions, I define four concepts: Representation, discourse,
hegemonic masculinity, and ideology. I understand representation as a “system of
meaning through which we represent the world to ourselves and one another” (Hall,
1985, p.103). With this definition, a system of representation is not separable from
ideological knowledge constructing every social practices and interactions among people.
Thus, examining representation of transnational identities in Non-Summit refers to a
process of uncovering certain ideological assumption operating in and through racialized
and gendered foreign identities in Korean society. Discourse is defined as a systemic
process to inscribe “what is and is not appropriate in our formation of, and our practices
in relation to, a particular subject or site of social activity” (Hall, 1997, p. 6). Hence, it is
significant to examine discourse to recognize what kind of knowledge is considered as a
relevant true in a certain context. In this paper, discourse is utilized to divulge how the
racialized and gendered representation of foreign panelists are articulated to reproduce
the dominant norm of the White centrality in Non-Summit. Hegemonic masculinity is
“the currently most honored way of being a man, it requires all other men to position
themselves in relation to it, and it ideologically legitimates the global subordination of
women to men” (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 832). In the case of Non-Summit,
hegemonic masculinity is adopted to expose how the discursive strategy of representation
privileges White heterosexual masculinity as an ascendancy among foreign male
panelists. Ideology, in this study, refers to “the consent of subjects of inequitable relations
of power” to keep the hegemonic system as a common sense of the social relation
(Stoddart, 2007, p.214). Particularly, by centering U.S. military occupation in Korea, I
argue it is crucial to connect the dominant ideology of U.S. exceptionalism to the
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representation of White, Western, and heterosexual masculinity as a superior
transnational identity in Non-Summit.
As previously mentioned, I use critical textual analysis to examine the racialized
and gendered representations in Non-Summit. In light of poststructuralism, I acknowledge
that the four key concepts above are interconnected to frame the production of knowledge
and hegemonic power in this study. The discourse of transnational identities shapes the
system of thoughts of those who are more acceptable, favorable, or common as foreign
others by representing certain images through media. Media, as an institutional site of
hegemonic discourse production, circulate the stereotypical representations. Through
representations, media convince individuals to participate in the consent of recognizing a
White, Western, and heterosexual masculine identity as a legitimate, cultural, political,
and economic identity over others. In this vein, I admit it is essential to read Non-Summit
as an analyzable text, as a part of ideological work, since contemporary culture does
involve the process of how consent to social power is produced (Stoddart, 2007).
Therefore, analyzing Non-Summit as a media text unpacks the discursive strategies that
frame racialized and gendered representations of transnational identity in the show.
Finally, through my analysis, I aim to unfold the dominant ideology of the White
heterosexual masculinity operating in and through Non-Summit.
Critical Textual Analysis
Textual analysis is a type of qualitative analysis to demonstrate “the narrative
structure, symbolic arrangement, and ideological potential of media content” and thereby,
popular culture media are utilized within “the underlying ideological and cultural
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assumptions of the text” (Fursich, 2009, p.239-240). For instance, Berkowitz (2005)
examined news about female Palestinian suicide bombers by using textual analysis of
newspaper items. It is found that journalists deployed mythical archetypes to fit in the
ideological assumption of who are suicide bombers and women warriors within two
realms: realities of occurrences and resonance of myths. It means journalists produced the
specific texts of news articles to resonate with the taken-for-granted knowledge of
representations of a suicide bomber in this postwar era. This shows both journalists and
audiences produce and read off the media texts within the ideological and cultural
assumptions to prove the social order that they have understood is, indeed, intact and
logical. Hence, analyzing media as a cultural text is worthy to investigate in and of itself,
but more valuable when it is situated within the larger structure of social relations and
discursive formation.
However, analyzing texts, particularly those related to popular culture, has been
criticized by a lack of engagement with the empirical approach such as the everyday
practices or experiences of participants (Fursich, 2009; Phillipov, 2013). According to the
criticism, reading texts reinscribes the researchers’ interpretation of popular culture and
to disregard the participants’ context or experience of the consuming process. As what
Phillipov (2013) maintained, however, it is not possible for the empirical research method
to offer a purely neutral reading by participants because of “the constructed nature of
participants’ discursive justification” (p.217). To put it plainly, an empirical research
method such as the ethnographic interview limits to reveal the structured ideological
power, although the ideological operation is crucial to shape interpretations among
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participants. This happens when the empirical research method sorely highlights
participants’ consumption part without taking into account a structural context.
Additionally, in Encoding and Decoding, Hall (2001a) not only emphasized the
different decoding processes of messages among different audiences, but also
demonstrated the connected process between encoding and decoding moments;
circulation and reception are differentiated moments but they are related “within the
totality formed by the social relations of the communicative process as a whole” (p.165).
Considering each argument over analyzing media text, I emphasize the importance of
applying textual analysis in shedding light on the interconnected circulation between
encoding and decoding within the structured and power-involved system of discourse. I
affirm if the overall communicative process necessarily occurs within the already
constructed discursive system, it is significant to examine what ideological impact the
media text produces, in order to implant a particular message to audiences. When it
comes to the interconnected totality, this approach of reading media text and
investigating the ideological potential allows audiences to have a chance for taking part
in media literacy by critically engaging with media content (Kellner, 2011). Meanwhile,
this approach also leads me to situate this study in the field of Critical Cultural Studies,
which takes into account the politics of representation and ideological impact of the
dominant reading of foreign identities in a certain time and space of Korean society.
Hence, I recognize Non-Summit as a media text and thus analyze it as a site of
“ideological potential and interpret its mediated impact” (Washington, 2012, p.255),
beyond the debate over a weighted interpretation of production or consumption of media
text.
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In addition, I acknowledge Non-Summit needs to “be studied within the socialrelations and system through which culture is thus intimately bound up with the study of
society, politics, and economics” (Kellner, 2011, p. 8). This allows me to analyze NonSummit as a media text by connecting to the larger discursive structure formed by the
historical, economic, and geopolitical context of Korean society in order to unload the
ideological effect of popular media. Finally, I then aim to enumerate the ways in which
the media text of Non-Summit reproduces the discursive strategies while implicitly
implanting the White-centered ideology shaped by neocolonial practice of the U.S.
military occupation since 1945. Therefore, by saying “reading Non-Summit”, I mean to
watch the television show repeatedly and focus on verbal and audiovisual elements of the
media text, so as to detect the discursive strategy in the representations of transnational
identity in the show. Eventually, I read this discursive formation of representations by
situating it within a systematic relation of historical, social, and geopolitical context of
Korea. To do so, I will extend the contextual information of Non-Summit, in the next
section, by elaborating what institutional operation is involved and how Non-Summit has
produced a particular discourse within this context.
Non-Summit as a Relevant Text
In this section, I aim to explain different ways of shaping the specific media space
of Non-Summit. I provide a detailed explanation of program production including
information of the broadcasting company, a dispute and criticism of the show, and
information of foreign panelists. Through this explanation, I demonstrate two main
points: First, it is necessary to provide the broadcasting company’s economic and
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political standpoint since it adds an essential axis of power operation to the discursive
formation in Non-Summit. Second, I address the personal features of foreign panelists
more specifically to highlight the intersected layers of race, gender, sexuality, and
ethnicity as I analyze the interactions among transnational identities in Non-Summit.
Non-Summit as a part of broadcasting company
Non-Summit is a representative entertainment program of Joongang Tongyang
Broadcasting Corporation (JTBC), a Korean nationwide general cable broadcasting
company. Since 2011, JTBC has opened a new private broadcasting station and produced
diverse television programs mainly including entertainment shows, soap operas, and
sports programs. In 2014, JTBC was ranked at the top of an assessment of mass media
credibility, thereby which illustrates its influence on the Korean media industry. As a
core identity, JTBC proclaims its genealogy as a Tongyang Broadcasting Corporation
(TBC)’s later self, thus TBC was rebranded as JTBC. TBC was an affiliated company to
Samsung Group, but compulsorily merged into Korean Broadcasting Company (KBS) by
the forceful media regulation from Korean government in 1980. Hence, revitalizing TBC
from the dark side of media history, JTBC seemingly represents a counterforce to the
government regulation over media. However, there has been a huge controversy over
JTBC’s lack of legitimacy as a “neutral” broadcasting corporation. This is because JTBC
is owned by one dominant stockholder, Joongang Newspaper Corporation (Joongang
Ilbo). These connections prove problematic since Joong-ang News Corporation is mainly
owned by the Samsung group and the chairman of Joongang Ilbo is a family member of
Samsung’s owner. This interconnected relation between the press and conglomerate is
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integrally assumed when a program of JTBC is analyzed due to a specific economic and
political interests between power of institutions. Therefore, media products produced by
JTBC should be interpreted within the particular profit-relevant stance of capitalism,
neoliberalism, and anti-government.
Additionally, JTBC’s main slogan is “Diverse Enjoyment” and the Corporate
Identity (CI) is the logo of a rainbow with the written slogan using the color of rainbow,
which implies the pursuit of diversity and creativity while distancing it from skewed or
narrow perspectives. This slogan seems to adequately qualify Non-Summit as a
representative entertainment program in JTBC. As a type of talk-show, Non-Summit
projects diverse foreign panelists and suggests creative resolutions of global or local
issues from these panelists. In other words, Non-Summit is a space with which the two
main slogans of JTBC perfectly match because the presence of foreign panelists
explicitly signifies diverse and creative multicultural values.
Whereas world leaders at the UN Summit discuss about an international peace
and security system, the twelve foreign panelists, who insist themselves as a
representative of each country, gather together and hold a “Non-Summit” in
Korea for the peaceful and blissful future of the global youth (Im, 2014b).
This opening line of the show, therefore, could be understood within the concept of the
main slogan of JTBC to disclose how Non-Summit tries to accomplish its diversity and
creativity throughout the program. For instance, in the beginning of the program, twelve
foreign panelists announced major news from each country as a weekly newscast.
However, the short news report is not enough to show worldwide and diverse issues since
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there are only twelve countries that viewers are regularly exposed to. In addition, there
have been frequent public opinions questioning the limited visibility of main foreign
countries, and requesting more inclusion from worldwide countries. Therefore, NonSummit has tried to create “global diversity” in the program. More precisely, the
production crew created a new subsidiary program is called, “What is this country? It is
our neighbor!” (Mwonnara? iunnara!). It is a subsidiary section in which a weekly
foreign representative from various countries, mostly different from the countries already
introduced, appears and presents their culture before the main foreign panelists start a
discussion. With this subsidiary program, therefore, the production crews not only did
become more inclusive, and thereby a more desirable program for audiences, but also
accomplished the main slogan of JTBC, “Diverse Enjoyment,” by adding more “fresh”
foreigners that audience can enjoy.
Based on what is discussed above, I argue Non-Summit has to be placed under a
shadow of institutional force from JTBC. When I understand the media space of NonSummit within the influence of JTBC, it broadens or adds contexts to how and why the
foreign characters are recruited and represented in the show. In addition, revealing the
connection between Non-Summit and JTBC explains how a particular program forms its
identity within an institutional context. Specifically, it means that a program mostly
embodies a specific stance or purpose of the broadcasting company. Thereby, this
contextualization allows us to connect the discourse produced by a program of JTBC to
the larger power structure of broadcasting institutions, and further, of Korean society.
Therefore, the information of media institution offers me the eligibility of applying
textual analysis to this thesis because the institutional influence reveals the larger force of
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social structures operates in and through representations and discourses Non-Summit
reproduces.
Non-Summit as a negotiated media space
Since 2014, Non-Summit has led a new trend of “foreigners in entertainment
shows.” It is overgeneralized to say that Non-Summit is a cornerstone of this new trend of
variety shows since foreign guests started appearing in Korean media. However, it is
recognizable that Non-Summit has opened up a new media space by centering the foreign
panelists as main characters who lead most of the discussion in the show and suggest
varied ideas to Korean society; it is differentiated from previous programs in which
foreign guests are simply portrayed as extra characters to entertain the major Korean
audience by providing their struggles and experiences of assimilation in Korean society.
Leading this new trend of variety shows, Non-Summit won an award for the best variety
show at the Baeksang Art Award in 2015 (Jang, 2015). Moreover, production crews
started spinning a new program off from Non-Summit in 2015, and selling the publication
rights to China and Turkey. The increased popularity of Non-Summit and the export of its
content not only verifies the considerable influence of Non-Summit on the Korean media
industry, but also analytically extends its influence of the discourse that Non-Summit has
produced and circulated as information, knowledge, and value.
This last sentence leads me to address an important point: Non-Summit as a
negotiated media space. By introducing a new variety show in 2014, production crews of
Non-Summit seemed to hit the “spot” in which the globalization of Korean society and
fresh entertaining factors are intersected. To maximize entertaining points, producers and
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writers of variety shows tend to use provocative images and exaggerated content in the
program. Non-Summit is not an exception, but achieves this differently. Non-Summit does
not sell provocative images but promotes the exotic cultural information to its audience.
Since Non-Summit has utilized culture, global diversity, and foreigners as entertaining
factors in the show, contents of the show is oftentimes put under critical inspections from
audience. For instance, some viewers take the content of discussion from the show as an
entertaining point, however, others focus on the informative aspect of the show and
evaluate whether panelists or production crews provide appropriate or morally suitable
knowledge to the audience. To elaborate this further, I want to discuss several disputes
about the certain information, knowledge and value produced by Non-Summit.
Specifically, I emphasize the specific debate over the Rising Sun Flag and Kimigayo
since it explicitly exposes a process of negotiation between audience and production
crews. In the 40th episode, the Rising Sun Flag was shown when a Japanese panelist
showed a picture of mega-sized and expensive tuna found in Japan, and Kimigayo was
for a temporal Japanese panelist as a background music in the 17th episode. It aroused
public anger from the audience since the Rising Sun Flag and Kimigayo symbolize
Japanese imperialism, which is a reminder to the Korean audience of their colonial
history tied with Japan. In response to criticism from its audiences, the production crew
of Non-Summit posted a public apology. However, this controversy was so intense that it
threatened the moral core of Non-Summit. Since, the Korea Communication Standards
Commission became involved in this incident to deliberate the contents of Non-Summit.
This example well demonstrates that audiences critically receive the information,
knowledge, and value produced by Non-Summit although they express different opinions
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on the content or controversy from the show. Audiences not just focus or consume NonSummit as an entertaining show, but also evaluate or challenge the appropriateness of
contents that Non-Summit produces. It underlines how influential and important the
representation and discourse that Non-Summit produces are to audiences and how
audiences are critically engaged with the content of Non-Summit. However, most
importantly, the criticism was mainly aimed at the production crew, not foreign panelists.
This illuminates the role of the production crew in managing who controls certain content
or opinions from foreign panelists, and the audience’s perception that production crews
invisibly but manifestly are involved in producing the value-laden discourse in NonSummit. Therefore, it notes that audience acknowledge the authority and power of the
production crew on the content of Non-Summit and it also enables me to center my
analysis on representations and discourse of the show in this study, which resonates with
my use of critical textual analysis. In sum, I provided detailed context of Non-Summit as
a relevant media text to study. By demonstrating how the institutional power operates
underneath the show, I aimed to take into account the larger structures involved in the
construction of media text. Then, by examining Non-Summit as a negotiated site with
viewers, I highlighted the production of images and discourse to be interrogated in this
thesis. From the next section, I provide detailed information on the foreign panelists to
stress the complex intersecting identity of transnational characters in Non-Summit.
The foreign representatives – The Group of twenty
Before introducing the foreign characters, I want to point out how Non-Summit
casts the panelists. On the main website of Non-Summit, a section is available for
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foreigners to apply to participate in the program. A guideline is posted by the production
crew and anyone can freely post an application after becoming a member. When posting
an application, a prospective panelist needs to put his name, age, nationality, fluency in
Korean, job, degree, and period of residence in Korea. Then, the applications are
accessible only to the production crew, so it is not clearly suggested what specific
processes are involved after producers review the applications. However, one point is
obvious that the production crew for Non-Summit is in the position of authority to select
foreign panelists. Since the only production looks through applications and contacts
“suitable” foreigners for an interview. The main producer explains the standard they set
for casting panelists in Non-Summit.
There were two main points to be considered when we cast foreign panelists:
First, we looked for new foreigners who have not appeared on television shows
before. Second, it was necessary to cast foreigners who have spent most part of
life in their homelands. In addition, we tried to avoid casting the half-Korean
foreigners since it is hard to rule out the influence of Korean’s traditional values
from the half-Korean family (Jung & Choi, 2014)
In this part of interview, the main producer, Jung-a Im, addressed what standards were
considered when production crew casted foreign panelists in the first season of NonSummit. According to Jung-a Im, production crews did cast the eleven foreign panelists
who are not influenced by Korean cultural traditions, thus Korean audiences enjoy the
unknown, new, and fresh foreign identities in Non-Summit. In addition, it is important for
production crews to cast foreign characters who could communicate their perspectives
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clearly, since foreign panelists are required to express their opinions during the
discussion. For example, when production crews had an interview with Robin Deiana,
who is the foreign panelist from France, they thought he was qualified to join the
program since he expressed opinions clearly although he was not fluent in Korean.
Through this interview, it is found that the standard of selecting foreigners matches with
what production aims for in Non-Summit: a talk show suggesting unconventional
solutions from foreign perspectives. Therefore, production needs fresh, authentic, and
exotic foreigners who have more experiences in their home land and are less exposed to
Korean traditions. Simultaneously, producers demand foreign characters who are
educated and assimilated moderately. Therefore, foreign panelists are able to express
their viewpoints clearly and fluently in Korean and participate in producing the sense of
“Korean comedy.”
In this context, I expect to reveal what type of foreigners are picked as main
characters by providing detailed information on the foreign panelists in this following
section. More precisely, I select twelve foreign panelists from the first season which I
concentrate on in this study. First, nine initial panelists (Patry, Alberto, Rasch, Kaya,
Okyere, Zhang, Terada, Deiana, and Lindemann) who have gained popularity and public
awareness through the first season are chosen. Second, three panelists (Belyakov,
Rashad, and Gorito) who replaced the vacancies in the middle of the first season are
added. I add these three panelists since their existence has provided many dynamic
aspects regarding racialized and gendered identity in the show, which shares a context of
the research goal of this thesis. To delineate the information of foreign panelists, I include
the basic profiles provided by production, personal information provided by news articles
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and blogs, and the particular image or characteristic of each panelist constructed
throughout the show.
Guillaume Patry is from Canada. Guillaume used to work as a professional
programmer, but he is currently known and working as an entertainer after appearing in
Non-Summit as a panelist. Patry is oftentimes depicted as “cute” guy due to a particular
accent and meaning of his name in Korean. Thus, his comments are interpreted as a
romantic way, which is amplified with the subtitles produced by crews.
Alberto Mondi is from Italy. Mondi used to work as a dealer at Fiat Chrysler
Automobiles in Korea, but he also becomes an entertainer after appearing in Non-Summit.
Mondi majors in Chinese and he got married to Korean woman and has settled down in
Korea after marriage. He has positioned himself as a romantic Italian man in NonSummit. Among Koreans, his strong accented Korean has been popular by calling it
“Alberto-style Korean”.
Tyler Rasch is from the United States. Rasch was born in Vermont and graduated
from the University of Chicago. While he was on the show, Rasch studied diplomatic
science at the Seoul National University. He can speak six different languages including
English, Korean, French, and Japanese. Among foreign panelists, Rasch is called “smart
guy” or “power brain” since he can speak Korean fluently and make “professional”
comments by mentioning the historical and cultural background of Korea.
Enes Kaya is from Turkey. After graduating from high school, Kaya moved to
Korea for studying technology at Hanyang University. Besides his study, Kaya has taken
an active part in Korean media by constantly appearing in movies and entertainment
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shows. In Non-Summit, Kaya has been depicted as a unique and conservative character
who is against liberal panelists from western countries. He got married to Korean woman,
but he was suspected of adultery with other Korean women while he was on the show.
Because of severe criticisms from the audience, Kaya dropped out from the program and
flew back to Turkey with his family.
Samuel Okyere is from Ghana. Okyere was elected as a scholarship student by
Korean government and studied computer engineering at Sogang University. After
appearing in Non-Summit, he switched the gear to become an entertainer in Korea.
Okyere has been in over ten entertainment shows and two movies since 2014. In NonSummit, he is described as a funny character since he sometimes says something out of
context or unrealistic. Particularly, other foreign panelists requests for double-checking
what he said to production crews when he talks about the experience or knowledge of his
hometown, Ghana in Africa because it sounds unrealistic to them.
Yuan Zhang is from China. Zhang is studying Chinese language at Seoul National
University and working as a professional Chinese instructor in Korea. In Non-Summit,
Zhang is projected as a patriarchal, Confucian, and conservative Chinese guy since his
comments are frequently based on Sinocentrism and nationalism. At the beginning of the
season, Zhang was at a peak of his stubborn attitude, but he has been getting “changed”
or “open-minded” through discussions with other panelists at the end of the show.
Takuya Terada is from Japan. Terada is a vocalist of the group “Cross Gene” in
Korea and he has appeared in a various range of Korean media such as movies, dramas,
and entertainment shows. Because of his quiet and calm personality, Terada is called “a
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delicate hand (Seomseomoksu)” in Non-Summit. This nickname refers a slender and
delicate woman’s hand and it highlights a feminine gesture made by Terada in the show.
Robin Deiana is from France. Deiana came to Korean since he has had a big
interest in Korean culture, especially in Hallyu. In Non-Summit, Deiana is elected as the
most handsome panelists in the show by viewers. Nicknamed the “Paris Baguette guy” in
Non-Summit, Deiana represents an image of soft, kind, and cute French guy who has the
“Korean dream” to become a popular celebrity although he is not fluent enough in
Korean, compared to other foreign panelists.
Daniel Lindemann is from Germany. Lindemann came to Korea as an exchange
student in Korean University, then found a job in a Korean business consulting company.
Lindemann is projected as a typical German guy who has no sense of humor or who is
always serious in Non-Summit. Lindemann has a serious attitude and tone of voice when
he joins to discussion in the show. Since dropping out Non-Summit he has been shown in
various entertainment shows in Korea.
Ilya Belyakov is from Russia. Belyakov is a medical interpreter and majoring in
Korean language and literature at Yonsei University. Belyakov appeared in Non-Summit
due to the recommendation given by Tyler Rasch. Belyakov is very fluent in Korean and
he can speak three different languages Korean, Russian, and English. Thus, Belyakov is
represented as “smart guy” with Tyler Rasch in the show. However, because of
ideological difference, Rasch (the United States) and Belyakov (Russia) are put in both
extreme positions in the discussion.
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Samy Rashad is from Egypt. Rashad is invited and funded by Korean government
as a scholarship student. Rashad studies Korean language and literature at Seoul National
University. After Enes Kaya was dropped out from the show due to the suspicion of
adultery, Rashad became a main panelist coming from an Islamic country. Rashad is
depicted as a conservative panelist with Zhang Yuan in Non-Summit. Moreover, Okyere,
and Rashad are called “African brothers” since they are from same “geographic
continent” and have similar pronunciation of their names.
Carlos Gorito is from Brazil. Gorito studied Business at Sungkyunkwan
University that is one of the prominent private universities in terms of business education
in Korea. Gorito works at the Brazilian Embassy in Korea as a person in charge of
education. Gorito was the first main panelist coming from South America. In addition,
Gorito got the nickname “samba debater” since he has had intense discussion against to
the conservative panelists such as Rashad and Zhang in Non-Summit.
Research Design
In this thesis, I aim to focus on the first season of Non-Summit; the first season
includes 102 episodes that have been aired from the year of 2014 to 2015. The early
success in getting big attention from Korean viewers is one of the reasons why I want to
concentrate on the first season. Non-Summit has been evaluated as a novel, fresh, and
sensational entertainment show in Korea in which multiculturalism is becoming a rising
issue. Therefore, the first season of Non-Summit is easy to become an issue, only because
there are foreigners who are fluent in Korean have a bit serious discussion. Its high
popularity has been proved by a viewing rate. The first season had a viewing rate over
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five percent, and at its highest point, reached 5.5%. In addition, during the first season,
six foreign panelists have been on the show as the regular debaters, which provides a
consistency of constructing a particular context in Non-Summit. Not surprisingly, the six
regular panelists become a core identity of the program itself and they start new career as
professional entertainers in Korea. Therefore, this season is to become a particularly
relevant site to study since I expect there are the repetitive pattern of representations of
foreign panelists and it becomes the consistent and solid identity of Non-Summit.
For data collection, I choose six episodes from the first season; three episodes are
picked for discussing a global issue and three episodes are for a local issue. More
specifically, as the first step of data collection, I classify the twelve panelists into three
groups, based on how long panelists have been on the show and which episodes they
appeared in. The first group includes Patry, Mondi, Rasch, Okyere, Zhang, and
Lindemann who have been on the show during the whole episodes of the first season
(from the first to the 102th episode). The second group has Deiana, Kaya, and Terada
who have been on the show during the early stage of the season (from the first to the 53th
episode). The last group contains Rashad, Belyakov, and Gorito who have been on the
show during the late stage of the season (from the 53th to the 102th episode). Then, I
divide 102 episodes of the first season into three parts in order to get a same chance of
exposing each panelist in the show; and it is based on the classified groups of foreign
panelists. The first part is from the first to the 25th episode; the second part is from the
26th episode to the 53th episode; and the last part is from the 54th episode to the 102th
episode. After that, I choose two episodes, one for a global and one for a local issue, from
each of three parts. Particularly, I picked two local episodes from the third part because
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the number of episodes in the third part is more than other two parts, and two episodes
have significant debate topics related to the purpose of this thesis. When I select certain
episodes, I consider both viewing rate and the theme of debate. For instance, in the first
part, I choose the 7th episode (debate topic: Marriage; viewing rate: 4.0%) as a local
issue and the 22th episode (debate topic: Discrimination; viewing rate: 4.4%) as a global
issue. In the second part, I select the 46th episode (debate topic: Hatred; viewing rate:
3.2%) as a global issue and the 42th episode (debate topic: Lookism; viewing rate: 4.2%)
as a local issue. Lastly, for the last part, I include the 59th episode (debate topic: Gender
role; viewing rate: 3.9%) as a global issue. As local issues, the 71th episode (debate topic:
Gold and bronze spoon; viewing rate: 3.4%) and the 60th episode (debate topic:
Multiculturalism; viewing rate: 3.7%).
With this process of collecting data, I acknowledge it is a blurred boundary
between global and local issues. Although it is not clear enough to separate local issues
from global ones, I did sort the episodes since I would like to highlight the glocalized
power of Whiteness: (1) how the dominance of White centrality is shaped as the universal
value by panelists and (2) how the universal norm is utilized to evaluate a local issue that
Korean society faces. For the research procedure, I focus on examining the ways verbal
and audiovisual factors of the media text constitutes repetitive and collective patterns of
representations of foreign panelists. More precisely, I classify the episodes into two
groups (global and local issue), then watch each group repetitively. When I first watch
the show, I concentrate on how each foreign panelist approaches to each global or local
agenda, what their perspectives are about each agenda, and how the agenda is judged by
panelists in order to expose which perspective or value is pursued and put above others.
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For the second viewing, I more focus on the ways of constructing a certain representation
of each foreign panelist through the interactive conversation with other panelists. Lastly, I
watch each group of episodes to observe how the representation of each foreign panelist
is articulated to racialized and gendered identity in the context of Non-Summit. Then, I
organize the pattern of representations thematically to reveal how it is discursively
articulated to shape the dominance of White heterosexual masculinity in Non-Summit.
In sum, I aim to research the discursive strategy of representations of foreign
panelists in Non-Summit by applying critical textual analysis. Considering media text as a
site of ideological impact, I address what discursive strategies are deployed to shape the
racialized and gendered representations through the particularly constructed ideology in
Korea. Furthermore, critical textual analysis enables me to situate the representations
within the larger discursive structure formed by the historical, economic, and geopolitical
context. It is helpful to see the transnational operation of the dominant ideology of
Whiteness. Ultimately, I expect to expose the dominance of White heterosexual
masculinity in order to show the systematic ways of sustaining the inequality and
hierarchy of racialized and gendered others, recognizing Non-Summit as a critical media
text.
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Chapter 4
Findings and Discussion
The discussion of findings is organized based on three main points. First, I
examine the evolution of foreign characters in Non-Summit in order to reveal how each
panelist is given their nicknames or certain character roles. Characterization is related to
how each foreign panelist approaches a global or local agenda, what their perspectives
are about each agenda, and how the agenda is judged by the other panelists. Not only
does characterization affect verbal exchanges among panelists, but production crews are
also involved in shaping each character’s identity by editing scenes and providing
subtitles. My approach to representation leads me to focus on the way in which verbal
conversation and audiovisual elements, such as subtitles or background music, are used to
construct each panel’s characters in Non-Summit. Through this examination, I find that
characterization and editorial voice reinforce the division between Western and nonWestern panelists. I determine editorial voice as subtitles and audiovisual elements
produced by production crews of Non-Summit. By examining editorial voice, I argue
institutional influence on production process actively participates in reproducing
representations of foreign panelists in the show. Furthermore, this dichotomous category
between Western and non-Western panelists is complicated by an appearance of a neutral
and moderate position. Second, I discuss the utility of conservative masculinity, gender
egalitarianism, subsidiary programs, and homosexuality. I use the word utility to expose
how othered identities are employed to sustain the heteronormative and liberal
masculinity in Non-Summit, for instance, Conservative masculinity as an entertaining
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factor and gender egalitarianism as a fantasy of Western property are discussed in this
chapter. Third, I investigate what discursive strategies emerged to separate White,
Western, and heterosexual, identities from othered groups by analyzing the discussion
about racism and groups that are hated in the show. For this purpose, the contents of
discussion and characterization of each panelist from six episodes are used to illustrate
my main argument.
West versus non-West, and the U.S.
In Non-Summit, each panelist shows hands to vote for discussion, and this voting
process seemingly supports individual choice and action. However, the panelists’ choice
is already restricted within the dichotomous category “normal” or “abnormal,” which
easily marks the binary division between liberal and conservative viewpoint.
Furthermore, this division is oftentimes extended to the boundary between the West and
the non-West, although the boundary varies according to the specific characterization of
panelists on the show. In episode 7, for instance, panelists vote on whether it is normal
for people to feel marriage is obligatory in Korean society. Zhang, Terada, Patry, and
Kaya vote for “normal”, since marriage is essential for family, birth, and society. Mondi,
Okyere, Deiana, Lindemann, and Rasch vote for “abnormal” since they value individual
freedom of choice and love relationship. In this example, except for Guillaume Patry,
most of panelists voting for “abnormal” are from Western countries. Addressing his
opinion is unusual, Patry distances himself from majority of Canadians and keeps
liberalism as a dominant value in Canada. This comment subsequently clarifies an
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explicit division between liberal West and conservative non-West in terms of
understanding what is marriage to be.
The most noticeable difference between votes in episode 7 is between Yuan
Zhang from China and Tyler Rasch from the U.S. Zhang’s decision is usually against to
Rasch’s decision, which is linked the different characterization between Zhang and
Rasch. Regarding characterization, Zhang is referred to as “a trigger of controversy” or
“Yuan’s attacking” (Yoon, 2015c). These nicknames and subtitles are used to mock
Zhang’s patriarchal standpoint because his argument is immediately challenged by
Western panelists in order to interrupt or interrogate Zhang’s standpoint. With this
characterization, Zhang’s ideas sound like rough or unfiltered conservative idea thereby
his argument is taken as an attack or trigger among the dominant Western participants.
For instance, in episode 59, Zhang insists clear difference in gender roles since women
are naturally different from men who have stronger physical condition than women.
Then, other panelists, most of Western panelists, want to cut off or refute Zhang’s
patriarchal or conservative idea and subtitle is shown, noting “a trigger of controversy.”
One of panelists challenging Zhang’s idea is Rasch. Thus, when Zhang triggers a
controversy among panelists, Rasch jumps in the discussion to suggest a different
perspective to Zhang’s idea. Contrary to Zhang, Rasch embarrasses other panelists with
his academic and professional comments. Then, other panelists ask Rasch to clarify his
academic idea, so that they can easily understand the argument. Based on his professional
and fluent comments, Rasch’s high education from the United States allows him to be
referred to as a “Mr. Know-it-all” (Im, 2014a). With this different characterization,
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Zhang’s idea is oftentimes situated as the opposite to Rasch’s. This is encoded during the
following exchange between Zhang and Rasch in episode 7:
Zhang: “My future wife will give up her bachelor [degree] and become a
housewife. She always prepares breakfast, of course!”
Hyun-moo: “Let’s listen Tyler’s idea.”
Rasch: “I think marriage is a strategic relationship based on love,
and we should consider the marriage has positive variability in the future.”
At this point in the episode, Zhang shares his fantasy about a future marriage by
highlighting his submissive, docile, and domestic housewife. While Zhang n is talking,
Rasch’s unpleasant facial expression is caught on camera which is amplified with the
subtitle of “sigh.” Then, one of Korean hosts points Rasch to speak his thoughts. At this
point, the subtitle line is shown noting “On contrary (to Zhang), how about Rasch who is
always rational?” (Yeo, 2014). This subtitle explicitly positions Rasch as a rational or
well-informed panelist. By putting Zhang’s idea on the opposite side of Rasch’s idea,
Zhang’s marriage fantasy becomes an irrational idea. The irrational idea is interrelated to
Zhang’s characterization, which is subsequently interpreted as being patriarchal and
having a conservative understanding of marriage. In this exchange, I found the subtitles
and production actively participating to construct this different position between Zhang
and Rasch through characterization. Subtitles are written visual icons inside dialogue
blurbs that appear on the screen simultaneously with the spoken words of the panelists.
Since subtitles are a form of editorial voice with authority that offers a different
interpretation of verbal dialogue, nonverbal language or psychological states of
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characters, subtitles constitute the atmosphere or context of the show, to the point that
they can drive the meaning making activity of audiences. Therefore, the opposite
boundary between the rational and irrational idea of marriage is not only constituted by
panelists’ conversation, but also by the editorial authority in Non-Summit.
In this episode, the opposite characterization between Zhang and Rasch is
extended to a binary division between the West and the East. By grouping panelists from
China, Japan, Turkey, and Korea, a Korean guest notes that Eastern countries have a
similar culture and tradition of marriage. Such a narrative is particularly explicit in the
following exchange between Zhang and Julian Quintart from Belgium.
Quintart: “I was surprised when Koreans ask someone when he or she is
going to get married. Is it same in China, Japan, and Turkey?”
Zhang: “China has a similar culture because both countries have
Confucianism culture.”
In this exchange, Quintart refers to China, Japan, and Turkey, in order to group them as
Asian countries. By questioning the cultural similarity among Asian countries, Quintart
distances himself by claiming ignorance of Asian cultural practices. In response, Zhang
notes Confucianism as a connection between Korea and China, which is known for its
emphasis on collective identity, social ritual, and patriarchy. After Zhang’s talking point,
no other Asian panelists comment on Quintart’s question and, the conversation is cut. By
editing or silencing alternative perspectives on Asian marriage culture, production
reproduces the view of Asian countries as a homogeneous group with a tag of
Confucianism. In addition, this homogenization is used to separate Western panelists
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from Confucianism, which consequently leads division between the West and the East.
However, this binary division between the West and the East becomes complicated when
Rasch’s idea of marriage is situated as a practical and in-between position. In episode 22,
I found comments made by the European panelists, Alberto Mondi, Daniel Lindemann,
and Robin Deiana, are articulated and equated to the romanticism of marriage that
highlights emotional elements such as love, trust, and happiness. On the contrary, Asian
panelists’ comment are articulated to patriarchy and materialism of marriage,
emphasizing the value of family, showing off, and others’ opinions. In between the
European and Asian panelists, Rasch argues a marriage is a strategic relationship based
on love. This comment becomes a practical idea of marriage, which includes both values
of romanticism and materialism. Nevertheless, patriarchy, which is not included in the
Rasch’s idea, still remains as a conservative tradition or idea of Asian panelists.
In episode 60, this complicated boundary of Western and non-Western identities
is also found. When panelists discuss the origin, history, and invention of sports, Zhang
argues that the history and origin of golf started in ancient China. For their response,
European panelists raise their hands to refute Zhang’s argument. Even though Zhang
provides historical stories as an evidence to argue his point, his claim is fully challenged
by Rasch who is specifically characterized as a judge who determines which history and
origin of sports are more acceptable and genuine. A Korean host explicitly pushes Rasch
to decide this argument over history and origin of sports, and other panelists start arguing
to convince Rasch. When Rasch challenges Zhang’s idea that golf originates from China,
Rasch states, “it is important to check whether there is a historical record demonstrating
how golf has spread from China to North America” (Yoon, 2015d). This narrative is
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extended to an exchange between Samy Rashad and Daniel Lindemann. Rashad argues
that bowling originates from Egypt since a British archaeologist found a bowling alley in
an ancient Egyptian tomb. In this scene, Lindemann, a German panelist, argues against
Rashad’s comment by saying “We are talking about the sport, not an activity. Sports
without rules are not considered as sports. In that sense, bowling as a sport originated
from Germany” (Yoon, 2015d). After, Rasch jumps into the argument to determine that
the origin of bowling is from Germany, because bowling as a sport came from Germany
to the U.S. and there is an approved record of it. These two examples reveal how the nonWestern panelists, Zhang and Rashad, are situated as opposite to Western panelists,
Rasch and Lindemann. Whereas non-Western panelists make an argument based on long
historical traces and stories, European panelists build their claims on rules, records, and
institutions that are used to distinguish the West from the non-West. This strategy
highlights that Western countries are the materialized, civilized, and scientific places,
thus panelists from those countries make an argument based on reliable evidences. On the
contrary, non-Western panelists’ arguments are unverifiable and disconnected because
they do not or cannot provide solid or recorded evidence but share descriptive stories
from history. This argument implicitly reveals colonialism and imperialism has played a
role in destroying and/or delegitimizing historical records. Historically speaking,
colonization is a process of taking over one’s authenticity and the role of history from the
colonized. By removing one’s ability to trace history, the colonized people becomes not
authentic one, which consequently centralizes and authorizes Western identities as ones
being able to record and archive their history. Through this argument, the discourse of

69

authorization and authenticity is reproduced by Western panelists in the historically
constructed power context of colonialism and imperialism.
However, this binary opposition is complicated when Rasch is specifically
positioned as a neutral judge. For instance, Mondi argues that the origin of soccer is from
Italy by stating, “Now, I talk about something Tyler likes!” (Yoon, 2015d). In addition,
Mondi points out that golf is a sport that originated from ancient Rome, a version the
United States Golf Association has officially approved. Further, after Mondi’s comment,
Zhang starts his argument by saying “Then, my story doesn’t satisfy Tyler’s standard”
(Yoon, 2015d). In this conversation, Rasch is situated between a European panelist and
an Asian panelist to determine which one’s argument is more authentic. This in-between
and neutral position is amplified when Rasch mentions that the United States has
popularized and revitalized golf. With this, no panelist tries to verify or challenge
Rasch’s claim, but rather they all agree and take it as a fact. In addition, subtitles are
shown highlighting an overall consent of panelists that the United States is a leading
country of popularizing golf as a sport. Hence, Rasch as a neutral position is not only
constructed by panelists’ participations, but also by the intervention of production and the
Korean hosts. This neutral position is allowed because of Rasch’s particular
characterization as elite and the genius in the show. However, his elite identity is
certainly amplified with Americanness that has been proved by his educational
institution, language, and citizenship. Since Non-Summit already portrays a privileged
group of foreigners, Rasch’s higher education degree doesn’t fully explain his prominent
position in the show. Given the context of neocolonial relationship between U.S. and
Korea, Rasch’s Americanness as well as higher education allows him to become neutral
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and value-free characterization. It further reflects the current recognition among Koreans
of the United States as a politically and universally neutral or savior role in terms of
negotiation with North Korea’s military provocation in the globe. Furthermore, Rasch’s
privileged identity doesn’t necessarily participate in the boundary between West and nonWest as a neutral judge, but Rasch actually participates in keeping this boundary by
deeming or approving Western values more authentic and important than non-Western
ones.
The Utility of Conservative Masculinity
From the first section of analysis, I found that panelists are situated as either a
liberal West or conservative non-West identity based on each panelist’s positions on
debating topic, on their characterization, and on the claims in the arguments they made.
In this section, I show how liberal value is a constructed and promoted norm in the show.
On the contrary, conservative character is primarily utilized as an entertainment factor
within the dominant context of liberalism. As mentioned earlier, Zhang’s opinions are
usually against Rasch’s opinions. Thus, I mark Zhang as a conservative panelist and
Rasch as a liberal panelist based on comments made by panelists and Korean hosts and
guests. For instance, in episode 46, a Korean guest refers to the U.S. as a highly liberal
country due to its diverse demographics and cultures. On the other hand, Zhang is usually
characterized as a conservative nationalist by subtitles and comments such as “Yuan’s
mission is to defend China!” (Yoon, 2015b). Then, I strategically analyze other panelists’
position, based on discursive interactions with Zhang and Rasch. I acknowledge some
panelists do not fit precisely in the divided category between liberal and conservative
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vlaue because of each panelist’s intersecting identity. Thus, I argue liberalism as a norm
is constructed in the production process by deploying the panelists’ intersecting identity.
First of all, the liberal norm is reinforced by the format of the program in and of
itself. At the end of discussion, panelists make a final decision whether the debate issue is
concluded as normal or abnormal. This binary division is oftentimes deployed as the
division between the West and the non-West, or between liberal and conservative
panelists. In this way, panelists inevitably adjust their arguments to get a united consent
on the debate although their comments sometimes do not fit in the binary division.
Hence, it is essential to check what consent is made by panelists at the final judgement of
debate topics. I found Rasch’s name is included in all five episodes as the final decision.
These final decisions emphasize the equality, diversity, and individuality of society,
highlighting them as universal values for making the world better. Analytically speaking,
Rasch as a mark of liberal identity is included, selected, and declared as part of the final
decisions in Non-Summit. However, the final decision of each episode is predictable
because Western panelists hold a majority in the discussion. Through the democratic
voting system, Non-Summit tries to suggest a helpful solution to global and local issues.
However, the voting process is already under the major influence of Western panelists.
Besides, the voting system in and of itself to leads a binary thinking of either normal or
abnormal which is linked to either liberal or conservative. In this system, Non-Summit
pursues the equal, diverse, and individual idea of liberalism by covering Rasch’s highly
liberal identity in most of the episodes as a final direction of the program.
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In this dominance of liberal panelists, conservative characters are necessary to
balance and fuel the discussion, as well as to add entertaining points in the show. I define
conservatism as a valorized notion to non-Western masculinity in Non-Summit and
conservative masculinity includes patriarchal, determined, and provocative non-Western
panelists in the show. Along with Yuan Zhang’s conservative character, Enes Kaya from
Turkey is also characterized as conservative based on his religious identity. By calling
him a “stubborn guy” or an “impenetrable mind” (Yeo, 2014), Western panelists struggle
with his stubborn attitude during the debate. However, Zhang and Kaya are differently
characterized based on their different fluency in Korean. Since Kaya is professionally
fluent in Korean, he usually quotes Turkish proverbs to make his argument. Using
Turkish proverbs is a key factor of shaping his characterization, particularly his
conservative identity based on Islamic culture. When Kaya delivers his conservative
perspective, his idea is considered as an outdated or obsolete perception mainly possessed
by past generations in Korea. Thus, Kaya’s idea sounds too conservative or outrageous
idea among younger generations, therefore his conservative identity becomes an
entertaining part of the show for audiences.
On the other hand, Zhang’s lack of Korean fluency sometimes causes chaos
among other panelists, therefore, his argument sounds hard to understand, rough, or wild.
In episode 59, for instance, Zhang insists that there is a difference in gender roles by
noting, “Think about the quality of service. I feel more safe and comfortable if a female
nurse injects me!” (Yoon, 2015c). In this scene, all panelists and Korean hosts are
shocked with Zhang’s sexist comment and then other panelists raise their hand to refute
his comment. Thus, Zhang’s conservative characterization is strategically utilized with
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his nickname “a trigger of controversy.” Despite this difference of characters, the
conservative character is required to entertain audiences whose amusement stems from
conflict among the foreign panelists. Zhang’s unfiltered comments as a trigger are
utilized to fuel conflict, whereas Kaya’s eloquent comments as outdated extremism are
utilized to make others embarrassed or shocked in the show.
After Kaya’s adultery scandal,2 the reason for him dropping the show, Rashad
becomes a regular panelist who continues to bring the conservative perspective in
discussions. Interestingly, Rashad is characterized as a more extreme conservative
panelist than Kaya and Zhang, thereby earning him the name “the boss of conservatism”
(Yoon, 2015c). Particularly, Rashad’s extreme conservative idea is utilized as a scary
story when a Korean host asks Rashad to share the gender taboo in Egypt.
Korean guest: “Why is every nation a male-centered culture?”
Si-kyung: “Well, I will show you more surprising thing, go Samy!”
Rashad: “Okay, I will talk about a scary story now.”
In this scene, the Korean host introduces Rashad who provides the extremely
conservative and oppressive cases of gender taboo lingering in Egypt. To satisfy the
expectation of Korean hosts and other characters, Rashad starts the story of gender taboo
by referring to it as a scary story from ancient Egypt, and two panelists are caught on the
camera with a subtitle “very interesting.” Although the story is never applicable to the
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Enes Kaya’s adultery scandal broke on December 2014. See Shin, E. (2014, Dec 2) and

Kuk, J. (2014, Dec 2).
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current social practice in Egypt, Rashad talks about the oppressive rule where women
were only allowed to go out twice during their entire lifetime. In response, a Korean
woman guest is offended with the way of treating women in Egypt, and other panelists’
shocked faces are caught on camera. This conversation between the Korean host and the
panelist from Egypt explicitly reveals how the conservative performance of gender is
depicted as a scary or unbelievable story, and utilized as an entertaining factor for other
panelists and the audience of Non-Summit. Conversely, the link between an extreme
conservative practice and gender oppression highlights the value of gender egalitarianism
from Western countries. Since Non-Summit is dominantly a Western space with most of
the White panelists proclaiming the ideology of liberalism, conservatism is not only
deployed to make the show a more adaptable space for debating, but also to add
entertaining parts for the program.
Gender Egalitarianism as a Western Invention
In terms of gender egalitarianism, it is necessary to examine the characterization
of European panelists in Non-Summit. Mondi Mondi, Robin Deiana, and Daniel
Lindemann are the main panelists from European countries, whose characters are
frequently described as gentlemanly, romantic and egalitarian. However, each panelist’s
character is differently constructed based on stereotypical images of their country. For
instance, Mondi is from Italy and he is characterized as a lady’s man who frequently
mentions his flirty stories with women in the past. Lindemann is from Germany, and he is
characterized as the serious, boring, and bit conservative one who prioritizes an equal
society and a reflexive attitude toward historical faults. Deiana is from France and he is
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characterized as a soft, mild, and patient guy who is sometimes feminized along with
Takuya Terada from Japan. These different characterizations, however, are generally
utilized to reinforce the myth of gender egalitarianism invented by Western countries
(Kim, 2005). However, I argue the idea of gender egalitarianism is a different version of
conservative masculinity in Non-Summit. In this section, I consider gender egalitarian
identity as a Westernized version of conservative masculinity, which reveals a discursive
strategy of Western panelists saving their masculine and patriarchal space under the idea
of gentleness and cultural difference. To investigate this argument, I focus on episode 7,
22, and 59 because these episodes have rich narratives of marriage, gender role, and
gender discrimination among the panelists.
By sharing his love story and enduring love for his wife, Mondi highlights his
ideas of true love and his responsibilities as a husband. In most of the discussions, Mondi
highlights liberal, generous, and hopeful ideas of global and local issues. This liberal
stance resonates with his idea of marriage, characterizing him as a man who pursues
egalitarian and true love. In episode 7, Mondi says Koreans ask too many questions when
they decide to get married, then compares it to the Italian society in which people have
more simple and open-minded perception of marriage:
Mondi: “The real problem is Korean people feel marriages as their
assignments. There are so many social pressures and lots of questions are
asked to people in Korean society!...Italian people live their life freely and
simply!”
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In this comment, he finally highlights that a liberal atmosphere of Italian society in terms
of marriage by comparing to Korean society in which people feel pressure of marriage as
a social ritual. Based on his opinion of marriage, Italian society is described as a place
that respects individual choice and doesn’t question the decisions of others, which
divorces social responsibility from individual freedom. However, when he expresses his
opinion in episode 59, his saying is not consistent in terms of gender roles in family and
society:
Mondi: “Korea and Italy are both family-centered countries. Although it is
hard to say there are specific gender roles in society, I believe specific
gender roles exist in family. I don’t have a baby now, but I know woman
gives a birth in family. Thus, I acknowledge there is biological difference
in terms of gender roles in family.”
In this comment, Mondi refers to the biological difference between men and women in
the family, which is related to childbirth and rearing. The combination of liberal
marriage, gender equality in society, and a biological approach to gender role in family
contradicts each other when explaining Mondi’s coherent perspective on gender and
relationship. At first, Mondi’s comments seem to liberate women’s position from socially
structured gender roles. However, a family, along with education, media, and social
performance, shapes an interaction with individual family members to co-construct a
family-level gender identity and gender discourse (Blume & Blume, 2003). By separating
social gender roles from gender roles in the family, Mondi’s argument is based on the
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idea that it is not, however, a case for my family, which subsequently keeps his masculine
area of patriarchy within the family.
Lindemann oftentimes refers to Germany’s culture as a conservative one
compared to other European countries. However, his conservative perspective is read in a
manner of gentlemen, which is different from the conservatism shown by Zhang, Kaya,
and Rashad. In addition, this gentlemanly conservative masculinity is considered as a part
of gender egalitarianism by protecting women’s rights and areas in society. In episode 59,
Lindemann argues there is a distinction of gender role and points out that, “I think the
gender role of men is to become a gentleman. Men should respect women’s decision and
opinions” (Yoon, 2015c). When Lindemann mentions this gentlemean role, classical
background music is overlapped with his voice. In addition, other panelists and Korean
hosts do not challenge Lindemann’s gentleman role, rather his argument is reconfirmed
by the subtitles at the bottom of the scene noting, “Physically strong men should consider
and respect women”. Although Lindemann already mentioned his thoughts and opinions
derived from a conservative German society, no explicit connection is made to the
patriarchal meanings of gentlemen, manners, and caring for women. The reactions from
the panelists, hosts, and production to Lindemann and Mondi are strikingly different from
when Zhang and Terada talked about their fantasy of future marriage and family life.
Zhang’s fantasy of having docile and domestic wife is evaluated as patriarchal and
irrational so that many other panelists, particularly Tyler Rasch, challenged his
patriarchal idea. On the other hand, Lindemann’s gentleman role and Mondi’s true love
for maintaining family gender roles are not challenged, but are rather reconfirmed with
the background music or subtitles by production.
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Additionally, in episode 22, Lindemann proudly addresses the advanced social
enactment of gender equality in German society demonstrated by the higher rank in
Gender Gap Index (GGI). However, Lindemann also says feminism gets out of control
because feminists try to change things like German grammar in order to erase the
distinction of feminine and masculine nouns. Lindemann thinks that argument is too
much to deal with if the German government changes a whole language for pursing
gender equality:
Lindemann: “Feminism in Germany is too serious because feminists try to
change German gramma….When people speak as a neutral position, they
are obliged to use masculine nouns. Feminists claim it is discriminative
and try to change German grammar. Then, the whole language system will
be changed.”
A similar opinion is also found in Deiana’s comment. Even though Deiana is proud of
France’s higher ranking on the GGI, he thinks feminism becomes too heavy in French
society and feels that French men experience reverse discrimination:
Deiana: “Even though there still discriminations remain, feminism is very
strong in France. That is because of women rights movement starting from
the French Revolution. Divorce is allowed since 1972, suffrage is given to
women since 1944, and abortion is legally accepted since 1975. To be
honest, I feel feminism is too strong in France.”
In these comments, both Lindemann and Deiana highlight advanced legal institutions and
government policy pursing gender equality in each country, thereby, they identify the
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legalized system of gender equality with an individual’s egalitarian perception of gender.
However, their egalitarian position is also used to criticize feminism as too much, using
examples of reverse discrimination and a crisis in the language system.
This narrative of gender egalitarianism as Western invention is also linked to the
liberalism and egalitarianism of the United States. Different from the characterization of
European panelists, Tyler Rasch, characterized as Mr. Know-it-all, usually sets his
argument based on conceptual definitions, knowledge, and institutional examples. In
episode 59, Rasch defines the difference between sex and gender and suggests that other
panelists separate an issue of gender roles from sex. Then, Rasch continues to argue
every gender role is socially constructed, although women and men have different
physical bodies. Furthermore, Rasch uses an example of institutional aid to support
disadvantaged groups and to seek social equality in the U.S. In episode 22, Rasch refers
to Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), while insisting an institutional
support is essential to overcome any types of discrimination in society. To highlight the
gender equality in the U.S., Rasch also provide an example of Sheryl Sandberg the chief
operating officer of Facebook, and refers to her success as a way of encouraging women
to keep resisting gender discrimination and inequality.
However, his idea of gender egalitarianism become less coherent when Rasch
makes a comment on the custom of women dropping their maiden name and taking a new
surname. More explicitly, Rasch’s ambivalent perspective on gender and social
construction is exposed in episode 59 when a Korean guest challenges his argument of
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gender equality by arguing about the custom of dropping a maiden name after marriage
as a very patriarchal practice in the U.S. In response, Rasch notes the following:
Rasch: “That is our traditional culture. However, from the U.S. American
perspective, Korean tradition seems not to accept woman as a member of
family after marriage since Koreans do not give family name to their
brides. I think it is just difference of perspective to see family and family
name.”
In this comment, two main points are found: Rasch considers the social custom of taking
a surname as a cultural practice and he refuses an explicit link between the social custom
and the larger patriarchal practice. Even though Rasch implicitly acknowledges a
patriarchal aspect of marriage custom in the U.S., he doesn’t vocalize the point but starts
his argument by referring to Korea’s marriage custom as more patriarchal at the first
point. More precisely, two main strategies are found when Rasch makes this argument:
Rasch notes Korean’s marriage tradition and challenges it by asking a reverse question
which one is more patriarchal? Moreover, Rasch concludes this argument by calling it a
different perspective or a different approach to the customs of each country. With these
strategies, however, Rasch paradoxically admits the custom of dropping a maiden name
remains patriarchal by including women as a part of family while Korean’s marriage
custom is patriarchal by not including women as a family member.
Although Rasch contends gender is a socially constructed concept and that the
U.S. has advanced institutional systems to back up the social structure for gender
equality, his answer to the custom of dropping a maiden name contradicts his original
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egalitarian perspective. Even though there have been legal changes made in the custom of
dropping a maid name in the U.S., Rasch doesn’t explain these systemic changes, but
rather refers to the custom as a traditional culture. This is because the question explicitly
criticizes patriarchal idea of the U.S., Rasch doesn’t want to attach a label of patriarchy to
his identity as a White, heterosexual, liberal, and elite man. When Rasch actually faces to
the problem and critiques of patriarchy, he doesn’t explain how this custom has been
changed by legal procedures and institutional supports in the U.S. Instead, he tries to
distance the tag of patriarchy from himself by putting Korean’s tradition under the same
surveillance of patriarchy.
Through the examination of gender egalitarian as a Western invention, I
discovered three discursive strategies made by Western panelists. First, these panelists
depend on their liberal and equal idea of gender roles and lack of discrimination on the
numerical index, law, social institutions and exemplars of successful women in their
countries. Second, their personal comments, however, cause gaps between what they
argue and what they actually believe. Put plainly, the panelists are proud of their
advanced consciousness and system of gender equality, but simultaneously try to contain
feminism, so that whole system of patriarchy is not threatened by heavy feminists. Lastly,
Western panelists focus on women as a role of victims when they discuss gender roles
and discrimination. However, panelists do not become critical of patriarchal systems and
male-dominant structures, but instead celebrate the history of feminine social progress in
gender equality. Through this discursive strategy, Western panelists keep their positions
as gender egalitarians by celebrating the progressive system of gender equality, however,
they still save a patriarchal space by keeping gender roles in one’s family, by aiming to
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be a gentleman, and by comparing their different historical perspectives of patriarchal
traditions.
The utility of segments, and homosexuality
In chapter two, I briefly mentioned a subsidiary program in Non-Summit. As a
segment, a subsidiary program is added to include various foreigners from other
countries, which is related to the main slogan “Diverse Enjoyment” proclaimed by the
broadcasting company. I referred to this segment to reveal that Non-Summit is under the
influence of the institutional operation. In this section, I extend this analysis to
demonstrate how segments are operationally utilized to produce the discursive strategy of
Western dominance in Non-Summit. I argue segments are introduced to amplify
foreignness and exotic culture as selling points, as well as to alleviate the White dominant
visibility by including fresh foreign bodies in the show. To do so, I examine two major
segments that Non-Summit introduced across six episodes: Global Cultural Matchup and
It is our neighbor!
First, Global Cultural Matchup is introduced with its tagline “Knowing your own
culture and casting away a prejudice on other culture.” In this segment, a topic is given
for sharing, then panelists provide information on each country. For instance, in episode
7, the topic is The best vacation spot. Then, each panelist introduces and shares vacation
locations in each country. In this segment, each panelist’s saying is characterized as an
informative news or lecture, which subsequently conceptualizes panelists as a source of
facts. Second, What is this country? It is our neighbor! is broadcasted for the longest
period in the first season. This segment is basically designed for inviting a foreigner as a
83

guest panelist. Mostly, a foreigner is from countries that have not been introduced in the
show, such as Thailand, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, India, and Cambodia, etc. A foreign guest
brings exotic stories and information about his own country, and the main panelists ask
questions resolving stereotypical assumptions of the country. Though each segment has
different content and format, these segments are utilized to maintain the Western
dominant space by deploying foreignness and pursuing diversity in Non-Summit.
However, each segment has a strategic way of reinforcing the boundary between the
West and the non-West, which subsequently keeps the Western dominant space in NonSummit.
First, the characteristic of narratives made in Global Cultural Matchup is different
from the main discussion, in that the segment provides an informative narrative. The
informative narrative thereby allows viewers to focus on the content of cultural
foreignness as a main entertaining point in Global Cultural Matchup. This segment
centers the story and information of foreign countries through the visibility and
description from foreign panelists, which connects to the matter of authenticity. The
authenticity refers to the difference between when Korean panelists talk about other
countries’ cultural information and when foreign panelists share their cultural story or
information. By providing the narrative of cultural information through foreign bodies,
the segment utilizes the authenticity of foreign identities in order to produce cultural
foreignness as an entertaining element.
However, the foreignness is deployed in different ways between panelists.
Particularly, Global Cultural Matchup in episode 7 abounds with such context of
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deploying foreignness differently. When panelists share vacation descriptions of each
country, France, Canada, and Italy are mainly recognized as well-known, never-ending,
and famous paradise for vacation. When Mondi shares the never-ending story of
vacations in Italy, the information is not fully new or unexpected, but rather reconfirms
Italy as the best vacation spot by an authentic Italian panelist in the show. On the
contrary, when Okyere shares famous vacations in Ghana, it is articulated as unknown
and not-reliable. For instance, the narrative of unknown Ghana is highlighted when a
Korean host notes, “No single Korean knows the best vacation spots in Ghana!” (Yeo,
2014). Thus, the vacations in Ghana are also articulated as unfamiliar. This is amplified
when Okyere discloses that he searched the Internet to get information of vacations in
Ghana. With Okyere’s comment, vacation spots in Ghana do not become fully known
due to the lack of authenticity and familiarity. In addition, Kaya spends more time
dealing with stereotypes of Turkey as an Islamic country than demonstrate the vacations
of Turkey. Daniel Snoeks from Australia says he doesn’t want to visit Turkey because the
conservative environment makes him uncomfortable. In response, Kaya explains Turkey
is known as a relatively liberal country compared to other Islamic countries and
simultaneously a subtitle appears noting, “Don’t hate Turkey although you dislike Enes!”
(Yeo, 2014).
Through the different articulation of foreignness, I found the foreignness of nonWestern panelists is utilized in a similar way to conservatism, which reinforces the binary
division between the West and the Rest. As a selling point, foreignness appeals
differently to Korean audiences who do not have same expectations of each panelist’s
identity. More precisely, foreign panelists are grouped as others, but the foreignness of
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each panelist has a different degree of otherness to Koreans. Otherness of Western
panelists, Mondi, Patry, and Deiana, is familiar foreignness that some Koreans once
experienced or aspire to experience, which is its major selling point. Meanwhile,
otherness of non-Western panelists, Okyere and Kaya, is unknown so that Koreans barely
visualize or experience it, so it is imagined in ambiguous ways.
Second, Non-Summit finds a way to become inclusive with various foreign guests
while maintaining the main panelists through What is this country? It is our neighbor!
However, the inclusiveness is temporal and limited because foreign guests usually are not
involved in the discussion as actively as main panelists. For instance, a foreign guest
from India appears in episode 71. The foreign guest talks about tradition, religion,
language, and politics in India, and answer questions from the main panelists. After this
segment, however, the foreign guest makes just single comment during the main
discussion of the show. This foreign guest is temporally and purposefully invited to
demonstrate the diverse inclusiveness but not fully accepted in the debate as a main
panelist. It becomes clear with the fact that only four panelists of color with one fully
dark body appear in Non-Summit, and most of temporary foreign guests are from nonWestern countries. Thus, fresh and temporary foreign guests are introduced to apparently
diversify national identities, without disturbing the already constructed White and
Western dominance in Non-Summit.
Arguably, I juxtapose the utility of segments with a strategic inclusion of a
narrative of homosexuality in Non-Summit Throughout six episodes, any overt discourse
of a homosexual identity and marriage is only found in episode 7. As a Korean guest,
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Seok-cheon Hong who is the first entertainer to publicly come out as a homosexual
appears in this episode in which foreign panelists discuss the culture of marriage in
Korea. At the end of the show, the debate topic swerves to the issue of a homosexual
marriage and a subtitle is shown noting, “A special marriage which is unfamiliar to
Korean society” (Yeo, 2014). Non-Summit includes a separate section to talk about gay
marriage by devoting seven minutes in the main discussion. During this discussion,
except for Kaya, most of comments are made by Western panelists such as Deiana,
Lindemann, Patry, and Rasch. Western panelists share the advanced social system of
legalizing a homosexual marriage in order to highlight the liberal value of embracing
difference. For instance, Patry points out Canada was the fourth country to legalize
homosexual marriage in 2005 and continues noting, “Instead, discrimination on
homosexual people is illegal in Canada.” Likewise, Deiana also addresses that
homosexual people have more power in France than other countries because many
homosexual entertainers and politicians appear in the public sphere. In addition,
Lindemann specifically refers to a Minister of Foreign Affairs as a homosexual male in
Germany to underline the open system of accepting homosexual people at higher
positions. After this short debate, Seock-chon makes a comment as a representative
identity of homosexuality in Korea. Seock-chon’s comment focuses on expanding the
general understanding of homosexuality in Korea. In this scene, Seock-chon appeals to
panelists and audience in tears. As a closing scene, the subtitles are shown as noting,
“Debate on understanding difference” and “Diverse ideas in Non-Summit,” then the
discussion swiftly return to the original debate topic.
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By deploying the special and unfamiliar topic of a homosexual marriage, NonSummit tries to become an inclusive and liberal media space in which diverse sexual
orientations are embraced. However, this one-time talk doesn’t make Non-Summit an
inclusive media space, but reconfirms the White liberal heteronormative space as a
mainstream in Non-Summit. More precisely, Non-Summit invites a homosexual Korean
guest from outside the show, maintaining the dominant heterosexual panelists as a basic
component of Non-Summit. Thus, the narrative of advanced legal system and exceptional
examples of homosexuality are mainly provided from Western main panelists as a way of
proclaiming their liberalistic value. By highlighting a homosexual male as a Korean
guest, Non-Summit is eligible to proclaim the inclusive value of diversity, promote the
foreignness of homosexuality as a selling point, and still maintain the familiar space of
heterosexual dominance in the show.
Between Discrimination and Hatred: Otherizing Identity
To begin with this analysis, it is worthy to clarify the identification of foreign
characters in Non-Summit. When each panelist is introduced at the very beginning of the
show, the country of origin and panelist’s name are only information given to audience.
Hence, Non-Summit identifies foreign panelists based on where they were born in.
However, this identification of foreigners turned out a slippery standard when Andreas
Varsakopoulos who is a dual nationality holder in the U.S. and Greece appeared in NonSummit. Although Andreas has finished most of his education in the U.S., he participated
as a representative of Greece, not the U.S. in Non-Summit, because foreigners are
identified by their country of origin not by their lifetime sociocultural exposure or
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experience. In this sense, Andreas’s cultural identity is fixated on the geographical
boundary as a Greek since he needs to share cultural experience or perspective as a
representative of Greece, although his identity is more mixed with or influenced by U.S.
culture. Therefore, without information of each panelist’s ethnic, racial, or cultural
background, audiences do not understand the diverse aspects of cultural identity since
they are only exposed to the fragmentary information of foreign identity.
In this context, it is necessary to point the overt visibility of White bodies in NonSummit, regarding racialized representations of foreign identities. Except for one fully
dark body, Samuel Okyere from Ghana, most panelists have lighter skinned bodies.
Specifically, panelists from the U.S., Canada, and Brazil, which all have multicultural
and diverse demographics, are all White representatives shown in the show. This
representative identity becomes problematic when audiences connect the physical
visibility to the specific country of origin, and learns who is commonly considered as
U.S. American, Canadian, or Brazilian. This overt White visibility also becomes
problematic especially when panelists discuss racial discrimination or loathing to others
as a debate topic. When an issue of race is put on the table as a main issue for the White
Western panelists, racism and hatred to others become a social issue to deal with or
observe, not a daily process as which people face discrimination and oppression. Put it
plainly, diverse voices and experiences of marginalized groups are muted when the
dominant White visibility discusses and diagnoses racial conditions in the privileged
position as an observer. To examine the second point further, I closely look at the
discourse of race, discrimination and loathing produced in episode 22 and 42, thereby
answer to two themes: First, what discursive strategy of racism is produced by foreign
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panelists with the overt visibility of White Western bodies. Second, who becomes the
othered groups through the discourse of hatred as a way of racialization in Non-Summit.
Let’s talk about race!
Episode 22 in particular provides an explicit narrative of race and racism in the
debate. The discussion starts with the subtitle noting, “The most sensitive topic in NonSummit: Racial discrimination.” In this subtitle, talking about race or racism is described
as sensitive or uncomfortable topic to discuss. During the discussion, two main debate
questions are explicitly asked: Does racism still exist in each country? and Can people
overcome racial discrimination? The first question focuses on talking about the racism
currently, which consequently crystalizes the division between who are discriminated
against and who are not. The second question is asked to provide suggestions for
resolving racial discrimination in the world, however, the discourse of racism is
concluded with the post-racial idea of we are all equal, which is encoded as friendship in
the show.
With regard to the first debate question, the discourse of current racism
demonstrates the boundary between who has experienced racism and who can just
observe and evaluate the situation of racism. Specifically, personal experiences of racism
are made only by people of color in the show. By focusing on Western panelists who
have never experienced racism they make comments as a third party by pointing to social
progress, historical vestiges of racism, and current discrimination against immigrants. For
instance, Blair Williams from Australia explains what was the White Australia Policy,
how unethical it was, and finally its erasure in current Australian society. As well,
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Lindemann becomes self-reflexive by raising concerns of Neo-Nazis and Hooliganism
toward Islamic fundamentalism in the discussion of racism, adding the connection
between social conflict and the increased influx of immigrants in Germany. Meanwhile,
Okyere shares his education of learning “White is good, and Black is bad” (Im, 2014a) in
Ghana and the racial discrimination he experienced in Korea. More specifically, Okyere
talks about his experience of being a background guest to White protagonists when he
tries to become an entertainer with his fully dark body in Ghana. Likewise, Bobby Kim
who is a Korean American holding the U.S. citizenship appears as a Korean guest, then
shares experience of racism he had as an Asian American. Bobby Kim refers to
Chinaman as his childhood nickname and notes some ignorant people see Chinese,
Koreans, Japanese, and Vietnamese as a same racial group. As a discursive strategy,
Western panelists retrospect racism as a past event and evaluate current political and
cultural changes in racism. In this discourse, Lindemann and Blair distance themselves
from White supremacists in the past by expressing regret or concerns about racist past
and present. Thus, Lindemann and Blair make comments as a third party not involved in
racist situations as neither a racist nor a victim of racist past and present. On the contrary,
the discourse from non-Western panelists, specifically the African and Asian panelists,
explicitly focus on sharing personal experiences rather than assessing racism past and
present. Through personal experiences, Bobby Kim considers the racism in the past as an
accident made by ignorant people and Okyere expects positive progress or future free of
racial discrimination at the end of his comment. Hence, Bobby Kim and Okyere are
situated as victims who have been through racism past, but become a messenger for
desiring better present and future.
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Furthermore, race is understood as a one dimensional understanding when
panelists discuss race and racism. The connection of race to culture, class conflict,
ethnicity, or physical appearance is made during the debate. The prevalent understanding
of race is based on different physical appearances, which is referred to as an
unchangeable element of identity in episode 46. Race as a undetachable physical
appearance, specifically skin colour, is explicitly addressed by panelists’ comments and
subtitles. As an example, Quintart from Belgium notes the different degree of racial
discrimination between Italian and Moroccan immigrants. By pointing the different
appearance of Moroccan immigrants from most of Europeans, Quintart says the racial
discrimination against Moroccans still remains compared to Italian immigrants who are
successfully accepted and assimilated in Belgium society. Following Quintart’s
comment, a subtitle is shown noting, “Immigrants are easily discriminated due to
stereotypes of different appearances” (Yoon, 2015b). This similar subtitle is also made
after Bobby Kim shares his experience of racism in the U.S., noting, “Wrong expression
of others with different skin colour.” In both examples, racial discrimination is
understood as the stereotype of others with different appearance and skin tone, which
prevalently applies to non-Western immigrants. This discourse should be interrogated
critically when it comes to the invisible standard of different others. When they talk about
different appearance and skin colour, Moroccans and Asians are implicitly targeted as
immigrants and different others. Thus, Western identities become a standard determining
who is other or not, which is subsequently amplified with the dominant White Western
visibility in the show.
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Besides physical appearance, racism is attached to one particular concept when
each panelist explains what is racism and how people overcome it. Examples below are
from the debate of racism in episode 22.
Lindemann: “Racism cannot be eliminated because of cultural conflict
between groups.”
Zhang: “Racism will not disappear unless developed countries stop taking
over underdeveloped countries and exploiting local labour.”
Okyere: “Putting aside the difference in skin-colour, discrimination
becomes a culture handed down from generation to generation.”
Kaya: “Turkey overcomes racial discrimination by allowing and
promoting marriages between different ethnic groups.”
Through these comments, each panelist indirectly connects racism to the issue of
different ethnicity, class conflict, or cultural difference when they point what causes
racism or what resolves racism in society. Based on these comments from Lindemann
and Kaya, racism is caused by cultural conflict and can be resolved by inter-marriage
between different ethnic groups. Omi and Winant (1994) notes that race has been
categorized as one essential idea following through three paradigms: Race as ethnicity,
class, and nation. Although Omi and Winant’s approach to those paradigms are based on
the context of the United States, this approach gives a useful frame to explain what is
understood as racial difference or race in these comments. For instance, race is treated as
a matter of ethnicity from Enen’s comment, which is oftentimes related to the difference
in cultural orientation according to Omi and Winant (1994). In this light, when
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Lindemann points the cultural conflict between groups as a core of racism, his saying is
implicitly based on the understanding race as an ethnicity-based issue. This particular
core assumption of race as a variety of ethnicity, however, was “to neglect stigma,
exclusion, privilege, and violence, all characteristic inherent in the ‘mark of race’ the
phenomic, ‘ocular’ dimension of racial belonging” (Omi & Winant, 1994, p.40). I want to
distinguish Okyere’s comment from Lindemann’s in terms of understanding race.
Although Okyere disregards the mark of race by putting aside the matter of skin-colour,
his comment of racism as culture highlights racial enculturation practice from generation
to generation (Moon, 2016). Different from Lindemann’s comment, Okyere refers to
racism as a cultural process of learning “White is good, and Black is bad” (Im, 2014a) as
a remaining legacy of colonialism in Ghana. Okyere’s comment doesn’t simply refer to
the different cultural orientation, but consider racial discrimination as a culturally
educated and embedded process. Likewise, Zhang’s comment also highlights the
structural force of constructing different racial positions in the world. Even though
Zhang’s comment is limited to the economic exploitation between developed and
developing countries, this comment implicitly reveals a historical and ecopolitical
pressure shaping racial inequality in the transnational context. However, comments are
based on the assumption of racial essentialism because these comments are not
incorporated to illustrate the layered system of racial oppression and discrimination,
which enables and restrict one’s identity to become a certain social subject in a certain
context.
Along with this racial essentialism, the discourse of racism is resolved with
general humanity which is encoded in the concept of friendship. At the end of the
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discussion, Mondi points the last comment by saying “We are all basically racists
because we are instinctively afraid of different others and defend ourselves” (Im, 2014a).
This last comment generalizes racial discrimination to a conclusion eliminating the
boundary between who have been discriminated and who hold the power of sustaining
discriminatory systems in the world. By projecting an idea that everyone becomes racist,
Mondi’s comment blurs the historical, social, and ecopolitical trajectory of constructing
racial oppression which differently applies to each racial group. Then, two subtitles are
shown by noting, “Children with different nationalities and appearances grew up
together” and “These kids’ race is friendship.” In these subtitles, the children refer to
foreign panelists in the show and their racial difference is covered by the concept of
friendship. Along with Mondi’s last comment, these subtitles convey the main message
of race and racism in Non-Summit: Everyone is equally discriminative and becomes
friends through conversation about racial issue. While showing childhood photos of
panelists, Non-Summit neutralizes foreign panelists’ identities as pure, raceless, and equal
humans who do not know about discrimination. This connection between childhood’s
memory to foreign panelists’ identities also allows Non-Summit to bring a concept of
friendship. Friendship is a relational term based on the equal positions. By highlighting
neutral position of childhood and relational concept of friendship, Non-Summit eliminates
racialized identities with certain bodies and lived experiences of racism from the show.
In sum, Non-Summit selectively produces three steps of talking about race and
racism during the limited time. The first question reveals the boundary between who have
experienced racism and who diagnose current situation without racist experience. The
second question illustrates racial essentialism through the conversation about solutions to
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racism. Finally, equal humanity and having a friendship are highlighted as a way of
harmonizing racial discrimination in the world. Through this discourse, however, NonSummit fails to provide an explanation of what is race and what constitutes relatively
different experience of race and racism among foreign panelists. Furthermore, this
discourse doesn’t clarify the differentially situated positions of racial advantages, which
has been constructed by historical, economic, social, and political system of racial
discrimination and oppression. The discursive formation of race and racism is finally
absorbed in the post-racial ideology of colorblindness, which is encoded as friendship.
Friendship allows Non-Summit to proclaim raceless or race-free society by having an
equal relationship with others. This emphasis on a human relationship over racial
oppression ultimately hides the transcendent consequences of the colonization and
minimize the reality of racism (Ono, 2010).
Who becomes Others?
The discourse of race and discrimination is extended to the discourse of othered
groups in episode 46. In this episode, two themes are found: First, which group identity is
described as a groups that are hated. Second, how these groups become othered in the
discourse of hatred and discrimination. As an overview of the episode, panelists discuss
what hatred means, relevant issues of hatred in each country, and future directions or
resolutions of this issue. This episode particularly provides abundant narratives of othered
groups that are articulated as recipients of hatred. Like the discourse of race, othered
groups are explicitly described and positioned as the opposition to White, Western, or
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heterosexual identities, which subsequently reinforces the idea of normative identities in
Korean society and the world.
It is important to start pointing out how Non-Summit defines targets of hatred. At
the beginning of the debate, a subtitle is shown by defining hatred as negative or
threatening words and actions toward different group of gender, sexuality, nationality,
origins, religion, age, disability, and race that people cannot choose. More specifically,
five different groups are referred to as groups that are hated in episode 46: Black,
immigrants, Muslims, Jews, and homosexuals. This definition explicitly connects a
certain identity, which is considered as a different group from major groups, to the target
of hatred. In this definition of hatred, identity is recognized as unavoidable or fixed
categories, not as a fluid process of making or unmaking subject. When perceived as
naturally given, identity is restrictively understood as one essential or fundamental
element, which homogenizes intragroup diversity and minimizes layered marginalization
of intersecting identities. In addition, these categorized identities are employed to target
particular group as hatred subjects, when these identities are referred to within the
discourse of hatred or othered groups. However, these identities are not autonomously
positioned as recipients of hatred, simultaneously situating other identities as groups that
are favored. It means the rest of the identities are separated from hatred subjects and
marked as favorable or normative groups. For instance, Blacks are stood out as racial
others when Rasch and Lindemann share each country’s issue of loathing about different
racial group. Particularly, African Americans are situated as the opposite to White
Americans when Rasch and a Korean host talk about ruthless suppression of Blacks by
White policemen. Likewise, Blacks are noted as unpleasant others in German society
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when Okyere and Lindemann share about growing Neo-Nazi and racial discrimination
toward Blacks.
In both examples, Blacks become a target of hatred. The main understanding of
this racial group is based on the different skin colour between Black and White because
White policemen and White German’s identity are explicitly referred to as the opposite
position to Blacks. Muting the social and historical context of oppressing racial groups
with darker skins, these examples only reveals Black identity becomes a target of hatred,
and simultaneously situates Whites at the opposition position as normative identity. This
is also encoded when Belyakov refers to immigrants as a group that is hated in Russia:
Belyakov: “There are many immigrants from Central Asian countries who
different from Russians. Russians hate immigrants because they cause
domestic conflicts and commit crimes. One of immigrants killed a White
Russian guy, and other Russians beat Central Asian immigrants including
that murderer.”
In this comment, Belyakov positions Central Asian immigrants in the conflict relation to
White Russians. By explicitly marking two identities as different racial and national
groups, Belyakov otherized Central Asian immigrants as a group of people who are
threatening and hated to White Russians. This otherizing of Central Asian immigrants is
coupled with criminalization and racialization: Immigrants with darker bodies invade in
Russian domestic economy and politics to cause social chaos by taking occupations and
committing crimes.
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In this otherization, I emphasize the power relation between who speaks about
hatred and who are referred to as groups that are hated in the show. None of foreign
panelists notes White, Western, or heterosexual group as a hatred target in their
comments. This is not only because most of panelists as debaters are from European and
North America countries, but also foreign panelists perceive their identities as
mainstream in each society, which is marked as standard identities compared to othered
groups. Thus, the setting of Non-Summit already authorizes voices of White, Western,
and heterosexual groups to assign some identities as groups that are different, othered,
and hated, which reveals an asymmetric power relation between who speaks and who
can’t speak. In this context, fixed identity categories allow main panelists to erase and
forget those categorical thinking is already socially constructed by people in power and to
keep their identities as a safe, normative, and favorable group. Furthermore, panelists do
not challenge the process of categorizing or assigning different others as recipients of
hatred, but criticize extreme words and action toward groups that are hated from unusual
group of people. More specifically, panelists agree on the negative effects of hatred
toward different groups, but describe the hatred and discrimination as exaggerated or
abnormal instances from few people. This implicitly reveals panelists overlook how this
hatred and discrimination are daily processes faced by specific groups. Hence, the
category of different others is not broken or overcome, but the others remain as recipients
of hatred. As a result, this discourse reproduces stereotypical understanding of hateful
identities marked as Black, immigrants, Muslims, Jews, and homosexuals, and
stigmatizes these identities as groups that are hated. As well, Korean audiences, who are
told and exposed to this discourse of different others, shape their perception of what
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specific identities are classified as hatred or unpleasant groups in Korean society and the
world.
To summarize this chapter, I provide a synthetic analysis as my answer to
research questions posed based on the evidence presented earlier. In terms of research
question one: How are foreign male characters racialized in the media text of NonSummit?, I show how characterization mainly operates as a process of racialization in
Non-Summit. It is not sufficient to define racial identities as a matter of corporeality in
this show, due to the overt visibility of White dominant bodies as panelists. Obviously,
the overwhelming visibility of White dominant panelists notes Non-Summit is already a
raced space for well-educated, nice looking, and fluent White and Western men. In NonSummit, however, racialization is more insidiously and complicatedly formed through
discourses of liberalism, egalitarianism, and homonationalism as a process of othering.
According to Omi and Winant (1994), racialization is “the extension of racial
meaning to a previously racially unclassified relationship, social practice, or group”
(p.111). In that, I read characterization as a racialized process because a panelist’
character is connected to certain social understanding of debating topic, and this process
is the extension of panelist’s identity formation in the show. As I find each panelist has
expressed one’s experience, perception, value, and behavior based on a specific
character, characterization is an influential element of constructing who panelists are,
what they can say with their identities, how they interact with others, and the way they
are perceived by others in Non-Summit. Characterization is built on the intersecting
category of corporeality, intelligence, idea, value, nationality, and experience. As I
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presented earlier, Zhang’s character is oppositely positioned to Rasch’s character, and
this different characterization is based on the degree of education, fluency in Korean, and
the different values which are conveying conservative or liberal ideas. Once the
connection between Zhang’s East Asian identity to conservative or patriarchal character
was built, Zhang’s experience, idea, and value are filtered through this characterization,
which ties his identity to a certain category. Recognizing characterization as racialization
allows how identity category is socially, ideologically, and discursively constructed. As
racialization, characterization takes time to build up the setting for situating specific
characters in certain time and space. Moreover, a panelist is once characterized, there is
an unessential link created between panelist and the expectation of certain perception and
behavior from the panelist, which consequently controls the identity formation of
panelist.
In this context, panelists from China, Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Ghana are
characterized as conservative, patriarchal, irrational, stubborn, and victims of racial
discrimination. Each panelist of these countries is characterized differently based on their
intersecting identity, nonetheless, their identities are characterized in order to highlight
White and Western panelists as a mainstream group in the show. Based on examples
presented above, the space of dominant Western identities is saved by the discursive
strategy of liberalism and egalitarianism, and positioned as a third-party to observe racial
discrimination, which separates them from non-Western identities. This space is also
sustained by production crews to keep the value of diversity and liberality through the
show. As well, the dominant space of White and Western panelists is also interwoven to
an idea of hegemonic masculinity in Non-Summit, which connects to the second research
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question: How are foreign male characters in Non-Summit gendered, especially through
highlighting the hegemonic masculinity in the show?. In chapter two, hegemonic
masculinity is defined as the most honored way of being man in the certain time and
space (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2007), and personal information of panelists are
delineated to specify which identities are selected as main panelists. As a certain media
space, Non-Summit aims to include male panelists who are white-collar, skilled, educated
and fluent identities. In addition, the hegemonic masculinity is articulated as men who are
not conservative, but romantic and gentle, through the discourse of gender roles, equality,
and (multicultural) marriages. The conservative idea is interwoven with panelist’s racial,
national and religious identity; while denying East Asian and Muslim conservative
masculinity, Non-Summit encoded gentlemanly conservatism from European panelists as
gentle or romantic identities. The difference between two conservatisms are based on the
relation to women; particularly, European’s conservative masculinity is recognized as
men’s respect or care for women so as to protect womanhood from gender inequality.
Furthermore, in terms of homosexuality, Non-Summit becomes a liberal and tolerant
space in which heterosexual panelists embraces the diverse identities, but never identify
with their masculine relationship to homosexuals. By connecting egalitarian, liberal, and
tolerant identities to White, Western, and heterosexual panelists, who are from European
countries, Canada, and the U.S., the hegemonic masculinity is dominantly possessed by
those embodied racial and gender identities.
However, I want to complicate this analysis further by referring to the importance
of intersecting identities of foreign panelists in Non-Summit. Although I addressed the
analysis based on a grouped identity between Western and non-Western panelists, I
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acknowledge each panelist is differently characterized. For instance, Belyakov’s White
visibility doesn’t fully participate in the group identity of Western panelists because of
his nationality which shapes the ideological frame differently from the most of Western
panelists. In addition, Rasch’s identity is oftentimes situated as a neutral, in-between, or
radical liberal identity which is distinguished from European Western identities. Zhang
and Terada are as well grouped as East Asian panelists in terms of Asian traditions,
Confucianism, and patriarchy. However, their masculinity is differently articulated
through characterization; Zhang’s rough conservative standpoint is coupled with his
language barrier whereas Terada’s patriarchal fantasy is feminized with his quiet and soft
words and gesture. The different characterization of conservative masculinity leads
different responses from other panelists during the discussion. Likewise, each panelist’s
identity is individually and differently characterized based on race, ethnicity, nationality,
tradition, and perception conveying conservative or liberal values in Non-Summit.
Furthermore, I recognize identities of White, Western, and heterosexual masculinity as a
dominant group in Non-Summit in order to add power contexts that multiply marginalize
others’ identities. More precisely, I examine how the boundary between Western and
non-Western panelists have been constructed so as to demonstrate identity formation as a
discursively constructed process. Thus, the boundary understanding neither aims to
categorize identities, nor perpetuate foreign identities as a homogeneous group. In the
following chapter, I revisit the last research question: What are the ideological
implications of media representations of transnational identities in Non-Summit within the
particular spatial context of Korea?. By situating analyzed themes within the larger
structure of Korean society and the transnational context, I further talk about the U.S.
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superiority, moderate Western-ness, and implied postracial and postgender ideology in
the media text of Non-Summit.
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Chapter 5
Discussion and Conclusion
In this section, I discuss what ideological implications are made through media
representations of the transnational panelists in Non-Summit. I situate observations
presented in the earlier chapters within the historical, geopolitical, and sociocultural
context of Korean society. For the purpose of this study, I focus on the foreign panelists
and discursive strategies in an attempt to uncover what Non-Summit implies about
transnational identities and broader racial and gender ideologies. By doing so, I
demonstrate how Non-Summit reproduces the U.S. superiority and European Whiteness
by distancing Asian value. Moreover, I explore how postracial and postgender ideologies
are implicitly reproduced in the discourse of Western, liberal, egalitarian, and
heterosexual masculinity in Non-Summit. I also address limitations, contributions, and
questions for further research that arise from this investigation.
In chapter one, I pointed out the asymmetric power relation between the U.S. and
Korea and the insidious operation of Whiteness by centering U.S. military occupation.
With the tension between U.S. superiority and Anti-Americanism, I illustrated how
young Koreans have built dual perceptions of the United States. I found U.S. superiority,
as a cultural and ideological assumption, lingers and operates in and through the
representation of the panelist from the U.S. In Non-Summit, a White, heterosexual, and
educated U.S. American is represented as knowledgeable, neutral, and liberal identity in
order to highlight advanced institutions, social systems, and national consciousness in the
U.S. Importantly, this process is supported by production’s participation in maintaining
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the character of the U.S. panelist with an identity that is barely challenged by other
panelists and accepted as facts with which everyone concurs.
In terms of White, Western, and heterosexual dominance, I distinguished the U.S.
panelist from other Western panelists because the U.S. panelist is generally situated as inbetween European and non-Western panelists. This distinguished position entitles the
U.S. panelist to become a neutral entity during the debate. Furthermore, the U.S. panelist
is distinguished from the European panelists regarding the freedom of speech, which
situates the U.S. panelist as a highly liberal identity.3 Whereas European panelists
prioritize human rights, the U.S. panelist insists on the absolute value of freedom of
speech in episode 46. Silencing Asian and African panelists’ presences, Non-Summit only
allows voices of Western panelists to be heard in terms of the freedom of speech, and
particularly positions the U.S. panelist as a highly liberal identity. Moving through
relationships with other panelists, the U.S. panelist has constructed a unique character in
Non-Summit: An intelligent, radically liberal, egalitarian, pragmatic, objective, and
exceptional entity. When these characteristics are interpreted within the historical,

3

In episode 46, a Korean guest explicitly refers to an American panelist as a highly

liberal identity by pointing the United States is where diverse individuals from all over
the world gather, settle, and create various values. By comparing the U.S. to European
countries, the Korean guest differentiates a liberal value of European panelists from the
American panelist insisting firmly guaranteed freedom of individuals in this scene. The
Korean guest finishes his comment by juxtaposing European’s long history, same ethnics,
and use of same languages with Asian countries.
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economic and geopolitical condition of Korean society, the U.S. panelist acts as a symbol
for how Non-Summit reifies the superior ideological power of the U.S. By portraying a
privileged U.S. identity, Non-Summit secures the superior space of the U.S. In other
words, the representation of the unique and superior U.S. panelist reflects preferences for
White and heterosexual U.S. masculinity and the continuous neocolonial relation between
Korea and the U.S.
However, when I examine the distinction between European panelists and the
U.S. panelist, I find a different way of understanding the hegemonic ideology of
Whiteness through the European panelists in Non-Summit, which is illusively read as a
way of challenging U.S. superiority. In Non-Summit, European panelists’ Western-ness
seems moderate in the context of Korean society, compared to the U.S. panelist’s radical
liberalism. The moderate Western-ness means a discursive practice of Western, liberal
and egalitarian ideology with which young Koreans familiarly negotiate in Korean
society. For example, arguments from the U.S. panelist stress a legitimate, firm, and
absolute value of freedom, diversity, equality and liberty, which is interpreted as an
ideological superiority in Korea. However, the superiority of the U.S. is admirable, but
not entirely familiar with Korean audiences who have crossed from old, Confucian
conservativism and the war generation to young, Confucian liberalism, and post-war
generation. On the contrary, European panelists particularly from Italy, Germany, and
Belgium express their perspectives moving between liberal, humanistic, and egalitarian
value and soft-conservative attitude. The familiarity was illustrated by a Korean guest in
episode 46, not only by separating European countries’ ethnic value from the U.S., but
also attaching European ethnic values to others, specifically Asian countries. When it
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comes to European ethnicity, an agreed value of history, tradition, and language among
members of society is referred, which implicitly states divergent and dynamic ethnic
values of the U.S. Thus, the moderate ideology of White, Western, liberal, and
heterosexual masculinity from European countries is projected as more adaptable to
Korean audiences who are enabled to find a way of possessing both Westernized liberal
and softly conservative identity.
When I read these different positions between European panelists and the U.S.
panelist in the context of Korean society, I apply two concepts that I mentioned in the
first chapter: U.S. superiority and Anti-Americanism. As a mild form of Anti-American
response, the moderate and humanistic Western value from European panelists provides a
discursive space for Koreans to position themselves differently from U.S. superiority.
However, it is not a counterhegemonic action because U.S. superiority is admitted,
reaffirmed, and not challenged by other panelists, Korean hosts, and production.
Throughout the show, the advancement of laws, institutions, and social system in the
United States is represented as a desirable one which other countries, in particular Korea,
pursue to accomplish for better society. Furthermore, there were no trials to keep nonWestern ideas as a main value when Koreans try to challenge U.S. superiority. More
precisely, the tradition, value, and idea of non-Western panelists are not pursued as a way
of challenging U.S. superiority but still recognized as patriarchal and Confucian
conservatives, which should be distanced from the show. As a way of internalizing
colonial fantasy, Korean media reproduce the idea of modernity and advancement as
Western countries’ exclusive properties.
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Analytically speaking, the distinction among White, Western, and heterosexual
panelists is relevant to the argument that there is not “a monolithic, hermetically sealed
‘West’ that posits itself against the rest of the world” (Nayak & Malone, 2009, p.225). In
this article, the authors highlight the intra-atlantic division between Europe and the
United States not only to expand Said’s understanding of othering, but also to challenge
U.S. exceptionalism. The authors interpret the separation as a way of othering European
identities and of constructing the boundary between the U.S. and rest of the world.
However, my interpretation of the distinction among Western panelists does not go along
with othering processes even though I concur with non-monolithic understanding of
Western identities. When the dominant visibility of White Western panelists appeared in
the context of Korean society, it is hard to disregard the privilege of Anglo-Saxon
identities as a group in terms of the expanded transnational force of Whiteness. Plainly,
we can’t ignore the privilege that White and Western identities share as a group in the
transnational context. Thus, distinction among Western panelists is not understood as a
otherizing process, but it could be an insidious and segmented process of reproducing
White hegemony in the transnational context in which otherization is mostly designated
to non-Western and non-White identities.
Hence, I argue the dominant ideology of White and Western masculinity lingers
in Korean society in which the U.S. military bases have cultivated and reproduced
physical, material, cultural, and ideological influence of the White U.S. superiority. In
this context, I call critical attention to the postracial and postgender ideology produced in
Non-Summit. By examining discourses of race, racism, gender equality, gender role, and
hatred group, I found the postracial and postgender ideology was generally made and
109

sustained by the dominant visibility and participation of White, Western, and
heterosexual panelists. In Non-Summit, the postracial ideology is articulated through a
discourse of minimizing racial reality which proclaims racism no longer hinders progress
for the people (Ono, 2010). In terms of discourses of race, racism, and groups that are
hated, Non-Summit produces three main arguments: First, people cannot disregard
difference, but reject and overcome discrimination toward racial, sexual, and ethnic
others; second, people can overcome an unequal system by continuous resistance; and
lastly, racial equality is finally fulfilled by having a true, equal, and pure relationship
between people, such as an international friendship. Even though I acknowledge there
were few comments that point to the systemic oppression of racial others, the main
discourse of race and racism is absorbed in the individual efforts and personal merits with
supports from institutions. However, the discourse of advance of institutional supports
and individual merits is connected to the already privileged transnational identities in in
Non-Summit who are differentiated from manual, poor, and not-educated foreign workers
in Korea. The dominant visibility and participation of White, Western, and heterosexual
panelists who predominantly produce those discourses consequently keeps up the
postracial illusion of equal opportunity and circulates messages of racelessness.
Similarly, Non-Summit reproduces the postgender ideology through discourses of
gender discrimination and gender roles. The postgender ideology is articulated through a
discourse of genderless entity that simply eliminates the factor of gender, but doesn’t
eliminate the factor of politics (Sattar & Rafi, 2015). In this research, I highlighted
gender egalitarianism and Asian Confucian patriarchy to note how Western heterosexual
masculinity is portrayed as a desirable and hegemonic masculine identity in Non-Summit.
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Along with the hegemonic masculinity, Non-Summit is already a dominant space of
heterosexual masculinity where the identity of homosexuals and transnational women is
still invisible and silenced. Without including homosexuals and transnational women as
main panelists, Non-Summit provides specific narratives of gender inequality and future
solutions. However, it is paradoxical for heterosexual masculine identities to diagnose
and resolve the issue of women’s equal rights and social opportunities while excluding
transnational women’s participation in the debate. Furthermore, gender discourses are
finally absorbed in understanding the biological difference between men and women, and
a future solution becomes an institutional support and genderless entity without
recognizing the politics of bodies in society (Sattar & Rafi, 2015). Gender equality is also
represented or exemplified with examples of successful women from Western panelists,
and proved by institutional advance in Western countries. Hence, the discourse of gender
equality is accomplished by Western panelists who elusively become blind to the factors
of gender without challenging the discursive frame they are discussing through or their
own male dominant space. In this context, the hegemonic masculinity of White, Western,
and heterosexual identities is not only built on keeping away from conservative and
patriarchal masculinity, but also on the absence of transnational women’s bodies, which
consequently reproduce the gendered space of Non-Summit. In this sense, I argue NonSummit as a globalized media reproducing discourse of raceless and genderless exposes
how Whiteness strategically saves its centrality in the globe and what ideological impact
this strategy implies in the larger social structure. Non-Summit as a public sphere is
already dominated by White, Western, heterosexual, and educated identities while
apparently embracing more diverse identities such as homosexuals, Muslims, and
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women. However, there is visible absence in inner-voices of this marginalized group
thereby the subalterns can’t speak at the public sphere, but are spoken by and through the
dominant identities.
Based on this explanation, it is further required to analyze how Non-Summit
reflects a larger structure of multiculturalism that already place in Korean society. NonSummit is celebrated as a media space of declaring a diverse, embracing, and liberal
multiculturalism in Korean society. Even though foreign panelists and production crews
try to produce discourses of raceless and genderless society, Non-Summit is not a space
for embracing ethnic differences of intra-Asian identities and, with it, a relevant
racialization process. In the show, a Chinese panelist’s masculinity is represented as
stubborn, conservative, and patriarchal whereas a Japanese panelist is depicted as
westernized, flexible, and feminized masculinity. Along with this different masculinity of
East Asians, Southeast Asians’ identities are excluded in the space of Non-Summit as a
main panelist. Furthermore, Central Asians are referred to as a threatening group of
immigrants in Russia and Muslim immigrants are labeled as a group that is hated and are
stigmatized as threatening identities. With lighter skin color than Southeast and Central
Asians, a Japanese panelist becomes a Westernized and liberal identity in Non-Summit.
On the contrary, a Chinese panelist is considered as one who needs to be enlightened in
order to embrace diverse and liberal ideas. Not only does Non-Summit keep the centrality
of Whiteness by muting subalterns’ voices, but also by representing selective identities,
who are willing to pursue Westernized liberal values and dismissing intra-Asian ethnic
diversity. Representations of Westernized Asian identities and unspoken subalterns’
voices implicitly reveal current conditions of multiculturalism in Korean society.
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Fantasizing Western modernity and advancement, Korean society aims to become a
multicultural place in which cosmopolitan foreigners enjoy a globalized environment and
mobility. In this process, inequality and discrimination among darker skinned and
underprivileged immigrants are erased or hidden. However, this division happens not
only between Western and non-Western identities, but also between intra-Asian identities
based on their nationality, class, race, ethnicity, and gender.
Regarding globalized media industry, it is crucial to examine Non-Summit as a
space of cultural production through which the postracial and postgender ideologies
reproduce, operate, and distribute in a global scale. Considering the influence of the
Korean wave (Hallyu) and global audiences, I argue Non-Summit not only constructs an
understanding of multicultural society and foreign identities among Korean audiences,
but also impacts on knowledge of racialized and gendered masculinity among global
audiences. As I briefly mentioned in chapter two, Non-Summit sold a copyright of
program format to China and Turkey (Yoon, 2015).4 Not surprisingly, foreign panelists in

4

Fēi Zhèngshì Huìtán is the title of Chinese version of Non-Summit. Since 2015, Fēi

Zhèngshì Huìtán has been aired. Currently, ten main foreign panelists appear and discuss
about a weekly agenda in the show. Main panelists are from Spain, Iran, Nigeria,
England, Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Turkey, Russia, and the United States. Elİn Oğlu is
the title of Turkish version of Non-Summit. From 2015 to 2016, Elİn Oğlu was aired.
Different from Non-Summit, Elİn Oğlu has a band and audiences in a studio. As main
panelists, foreigners from England, Russia, South Korea, the United States, Japan,
Slovakia, Spain, and Italy appeared.
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the version of Chinese media are visibly lighter skinned identities even though the show
includes more diverse countries than Non-Summit does. Likewise, transnational women’s
identities are also silenced and invisible in both shows. Thus, a White and masculine
space is transnationally kept and sustained by reproducing the same format of programs
and selective foreign identities through global media.
I also suggest that audiences in the U.S. are influenced by media visibility of
White dominant panelists and discourse of raceless and genderless produced by NonSummit. Throughout two seasons, a White, educated, heterosexual, and intelligent
masculinity is portrayed as a representative of the United States. While recognizing the
representative identity is selected by an ideological impact of White supremacy in Korea
society, I call specific attention to a possible ideological impact in which Asian/American
audiences, more precisely Korean/American diaspora, are internalized. First, a dominant
identity of White, educated, heterosexual, and professional work is articulated and
reinforced as a global, mobile, able, and representative body in the United States. Second,
Asian/American masculinity is further stereotyped positioned as a patriarchal and
conservative one, which is portrayed as undesirable and obsolete masculinity in NonSummit. Since Asian/American masculinity is positioned as opposite to the dominant
White, educated, liberal, and desirable masculinity in Non-Summit, the binary between
two opposite masculinity is reproduced and reinforced. Hence, globalized and digital
media amplify Whiteness transnationally, in that Korean media reproduce, distribute, and
rearticulate White supremacy among global audiences including Asian/American
diasporas.
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In sum, I examined how Non-Summit highlights the hegemonic masculinity of
White, Western, and heterosexual identities through racialized and gendered
representations. Analyzing media texts of Non-Summit, I found the hegemonic identity of
White, Western, and heterosexual masculinity is shored up by othered groups such as
Asian and Muslim masculinity, homosexuals, immigrants, and transnational women.
Within the historical and geopolitical context of the U.S. military occupation, the
hegemonic masculinity is understood as operation of transnational Whiteness in Korean
society. Moreover, the current political tension between the U.S. and North Korea,
renegotiation of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement(FTA), and domestic resistance to
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) have increased the international
dependence of Korea on the United States regarding national defense and economy. Each
political condition reminds Koreans of the current ceasefire condition, which clearly
places Korean government at a needy position of international relations, particularly with
the United States. Recently, Koreans re-recognize the hierarchized international influence
of the U.S. war power and political intervention, which reveals the explicit neocolonial
relationship between Korea and the U.S. In this sense, Koreans internalize the cultural
and ideological superiority of White, Western, and heterosexual identities as hegemonic
identities through media representations, particularly in Non-Summit. Calling this
internalized White U.S. supremacy Koreanness in this multicultural Korean society, I
finally argue Whiteness has historically and geopolitically shaped a cognition of who can
be desirable foreign identities among Koreans. Simultaneously, Whiteness has been
culturally, economically, and politically sustained and reproduced by Korean media
distributing White U.S. supremacy transnationally. Therefore, Whiteness, that is
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inherently transnational and invasive, keeps fed itself up by utilizing globalized media
circulation and reproducing discourse of a raceless and genderless globe.
Limitations of Research
As with other forms of textual analysis, analytical themes produced by a single
coder can be a limitation. Without having another coder, it is hard for a single coder to
avoid a critique of subjective understanding of television series. In terms of data
collection of media text, more episodes in the first season could further enhance the
analysis of characterization process in the show. The more narratives of characterization
process are provided, the more discursive strategies could be found in the first season.
Furthermore, some foreign panelists from the first season are not selected in this analysis,
which potentially provides more diverse intersecting understanding of transnational
identities. In addition, Non-Summit has started a new season with a great change in main
foreign panelists since June 2016. Thus, the analysis could be outdated when compared to
current episodes with new foreign panelists. Lastly, more episodes of segments could be
collected and analyzed to deepen and expand the analysis about the utility of segments in
this thesis. Even though I did have limitations in my study, I argue this research makes a
significant contribution to the field of communication, critical cultural studies, and
Korean media studies.
Significance of Research
Through this research, I believe I am contributing to the existing literature about
transnational identities in Korean media and the strategic discourse of Whiteness,
specifically in the area of media representation and discourse production. First, I
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understand and analyze transnational identities as fluid and socially constructed entities,
instead of dividing and distinguishing foreign identities into three or four categories of
identity such as longing, nearby, and compassionate group (Ju & No, 2013). By
demonstrating discursive strategies of becoming White, Western, and heterosexual
identities, I try to cross categories of identity and highlight an intersecting approach to
understand transnational identities in a specific time and space of Korean society and
media industry. Compared to already existing literature, this research is constituted with
analysis which more focus on discursive and ideological construction of foreign
identities. This approach broadens the understanding of multiculturalism in Korea by
shifting an analytical frame from Korean nationalism to transnational power operation of
Whiteness. Second, I contribute to the literature by providing examples to demonstrate
Whiteness is discursively constructed identity and how Whiteness is used to otherize or
deploy non-White and non-Western identities. As Projansky and Ono (1999) argued, the
issue of Whiteness is not only to figure out the representation of Whiteness, but also what
Whiteness is used to do. In this research, I found Whiteness as the hegemonic masculinity
of White, Western, and heterosexual identities sustains their neocolonial and patriarchal
space in order to otherize non-Western, Confucian, and conservative masculinity,
homosexuals, immigrants, and transnational women. However, this space is discursively
maintained by strategically embracing otherized identities and discussing about issues of
racial and gender discrimination and hatred groups. Hence, Whiteness is transnationally
reproduced by Korean media, and this process is continuously influential in that Korean
media popularity has been increased in worldwide media space.
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